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In this paper we document the economic outcomes of elderly immigrants to Canada. Our 
objective is to describe the extent to which elderly immigrants may have low income (are 
“in poverty”) and their interactions with the Canadian income transfer system. The study 
has  two  main  parts.  First,  using  a  combination  of  administrative  and  survey  data,  we 
describe the age dimensions of immigration to Canada since 1980, and the evolution of 
policies directed towards older immigrants (i.e., immigration selection, and eligibility for 
age-related social security programs). Second, using the SCF and SLID surveys spanning 
1981 through 2006, we document the composition and levels of income for immigrants to 
Canada.   We estimate the degree to which older immigrants support themselves, either 
through working, or living with relatives, as well as the degree that they rely on various 
income  transfer  programs,  especially  OAS,  GIS,  and  Social  Assistance  (SA).  We  also 
summarize their overall living standards, and the extent to which they live in poverty (have 
“low  incomes.”)  Throughout  the  paper,  we  also  explore  the  family  dimensions  to  the 
outcomes of older immigrants: distinguishing between individual and family sources of 
income, as well as outlining differences in the living arrangements (family structure) of 
older immigrants, and the implications for measures of their well-being 
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Several government policies target older immigrants to Canada. From the outset, 
immigration policy is tailored to maximize the economic contribution of immigrants, and 
even for those admitted for humanitarian or family reasons, to select those immigrants 
most capable of supporting themselves. On average, with possibly weaker labor market 
attachment or earnings capacity, older immigrants are less likely to meet these criteria. 
Beyond immigrant admission policy, once in Canada older immigrants in principle could 
be eligible for age-related transfers; however, several key policies limit their ability to tap 
the Canadian income maintenance system. What then becomes of older immigrants? 
Are the legal restrictions on income-support programs binding? Are older immigrants 
supported by other family members?  Do they work more than other similarly aged 
Canadians? Or are they marginalized, ending up at the bottom of the income 
distribution, not just relative to other older Canadians, but also relative to other 
immigrants? 
 
In this paper we address these questions in two ways. First, we provide a detailed 
overview of the policies that are relevant for older workers. Second, we use data from 
1981 through 1986 to document the composition and level of income for older 
immigrants. Our focus is on transfer income (most directly linked to government policy), 
and on the “bottom line” living standards. 
 
In addition to the direct discussion of Canadian immigration and old-age support 
policies, our research addresses (or raises) more general questions and conceptual 
issues concerning: Retirement behaviour in the presence of public transfer programs; 
Family dimensions of labor supply/retirement behaviour and the provision for old age; 
Immigrant assimilation and the role of the family; The measurement of living standards, 
and especially how to incorporate differences in living arrangements; The distributional 
impacts of public policy; and the credibility of restrictions in access to public programs. 
 
In our policy review, we confirm that immigration policy is largely designed to 
discourage the immigration of older individuals. For economic immigrants assessed by 
the point system, there are no age-related points awarded after age 53. Most older 
immigrants (e.g., those 55 and older) are admitted through the Family Class, usually 
sponsored by relatives (working-aged children). Sponsors must commit to “Undertaking” 
that restricts the ability of sponsored relatives to collect social assistance. Sponsors 
must also meet minimum income criteria, so that older immigrants – even in the family 
class  –  are highly selected. Using administrative data, we show that the share of 
immigrants aged 45-64, and older than 65, has been declining steadily over time, 
though such immigrants (combined) still account for almost 20 percent of all immigrants. 
 
In principle, older immigrants could be eligible for income support from three main 
federal and provincial sources: Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS), and Social Assistance (SA). OAS is normally available to all 
Canadians aged 65 and older. Immigrants, however, face several restrictions: There is 
a minimum residency period of 10 years in order to receive any benefits; The level of benefits (once eligible) depends on years of residency (pro-rated on a base of 40-years 
residence for full benefits). Some eligibility can be transferred from abroad, depending 
international social security agreements. The GIS is an income-tested “top-up” to the 
OAS. Base legibility is determined by the same residency requirement as OAS. 
However, with the “super-GIS” introduced in 1984, those with a partial OAS can have 
their benefits topped up to the maximum level of OAS/GIS. In principle, such immigrants 
with only 10 years of residence (with very low incomes) may therefore qualify for the 
maximum OAS/GIS. Finally, because of the commitment made by their sponsors (the 
undertaking), most new immigrants are not eligible to receive SA. That said, SA may be 
used to offset shortfalls from OAS/GIS (and even low Canada/Quebec Pension Plan). 
 
Our empirical analysis is then directed towards confirming whether these policy 
restrictions are evident in the income composition of older immigrants, and furthermore, 
where older immigrants end up in the income distribution. We use two main sources of 
data. For the period  1981 through 1997 we use the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), and for 1997 through 2006, we use the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
(SLID). To maintain focus in the paper, we restrict our analysis to men 20 years and 
older, highlighting the outcomes for men aged 60 to 64 (nearing “retirement”), and mean 
aged 65 and older (“potentially retired”). We also draw comparisons between different 
groups of immigrants: those in Canada 0 to 9 years (“new immigrants”, unlikely eligible 
for OAS/GIS); those resident 10-19 years (“medium residency”); and those in Canada 
more than 20 years (“long time residents”). 
 
The key outcomes we explore are the composition of income, especially income 
received from key transfer and pension programs (OAS/GIS, CPP/QPP, SA), as well as 
labor market earnings (related to retirement behavior). We also compare outcomes 
based on individual income to those using family income – allowing for the fact that 
older immigrants may live with adult children, so that individual income would be a poor 
proxy for actual material living standards. For family-based income, we also report the 
share of immigrants that fall below Statistics Canada’s “Low Income Measure,” as an 
indicator of poverty. We report results as raw means, as well as regression-adjusted 
estimates that adjust more finely for age, years in Canada, year, and location. 
 
For recent immigrants 65 years and older (those in Canada less than 10 years), we find 
that individual income is lower in many dimensions. Overall transfers are especially low 
for this group, reflecting much lower levels of OAS/GIS benefits (consistent with policy 
restrictions). The one exception is that this group collects significantly higher Social 
Assistance (SA). The “medium term” immigrants (10-19 years in Canada) collects the 
highest level of transfer income, both compared to other immigrants as well as native-
born Canadians (65 and older). This primarily reflects higher OAS/GIS payments, 
probably due to the GIS top-ups. While the individual-based income picture is  quite 
grim, it brightens modestly when we look at family-based income measures. Despite the 
evidence of family support, new immigrants 65 and older are significantly more likely to 
live in poor households than other Canadians 65 and older. New immigrants aged 60-64 
also have very poor outcomes. They are not eligible (by age) for OAS/GIS, and are heavily reliant on SA. We also find that comparing the SLID to the SCF results, that 
outcomes for older immigrants are deteriorating over time. 
 
In summary, our evidence suggests that older immigrants, especially those in Canada 
less than 10 years, have very poor economic outcomes. We also find that these poor 
outcomes are compounded (though not caused) by ineligibility for age-related transfer 
programs. Among a variety of questions raised for future research, we highlight the 
difficult problem of designing immigration policy to legitimately encourage younger, 
more productive immigrants, while at the same time supporting those needy elderly 
immigrants who cannot support themselves, and whose families are also unable to do 
so. 
   1 
1.0 Introduction 
 
A number of government policies target older immigrants to Canada.  First, immigrants in the 
skilled worker class are evaluated by a point system that only awards points to individuals aged 17 to 53, 
assigning zero points to those 54 and older.  Second, a number of Canada’s income security programs link 
benefits to the length of residency in Canada. Therefore, elderly immigrants who pass the first hurdle, 
either  by  gaining  sufficient  points  on  other  characteristics  or  entering  Canada  in  another  class  (e.g., 
family, refugee) may face limited access to the resources that most elderly Canadians rely on.  Finally, 
those  entering  by  the  family  class  are  at  least  nominally  denied  access  to  social  assistance  by  the 
“undertaking” signed between the sponsoring family and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. While 
each of these policies would appear to discourage the immigration of elderly persons who might end up 
poor, they also potentially condemn those elderly immigrants who nevertheless find themselves in this 
state. These possibilities are of particular interest given recent evidence that immigrants comprise an 
important sub-group among Canada's poor, and the elderly poor in particular.
1 
At least one premise for these policies is that elderly immigrants might easily become a burden on 
Canadian taxpayers.  For example, those elderly still young enough to work must confront the limited 
labour market opportunities faced by all older workers.  As a result, they might rely on social assistance 
or cycle through dead end jobs and Employment Insurance.  The restrictions on income security programs 
would appear to limit benefits to those who have made sufficient “contributions” in the past.  Extending 
benefits to those with short tenures in Canada would represent a transfer from Canadian taxpayers to these 
new  arrivals.    Finally,  the  sponsorship  provisions  for  family  class  immigrants  provide  an  explicit 
expression of the fear that some entrants might become a burden.  In principle, family class entrants are 
not allowed to access social assistance over their first ten years in Canada.  As we document below, the 
family class has historically been the primary means of entry for older immigrants. 
                                                 
1 Using Canadian Census Data, Picot and Hou (2003) find that the “low-income rate” is generally rising for all 
immigrant  cohorts  from  1980  to  2000  (controlling  for  year  effects),  especially  so  for  the  most  recent  entering 
cohorts. Veall (2008) documents low income rates (LIM) for all seniors in tax year 2004, and highlights that recent 
immigrants comprise almost one-sixth of poor Canadians over 65 years old.   2 
To investigate the possible consequences of these policies for elderly immigrants we provide new 
evidence on their entry to Canada, their representation among the poor, and how the composition of their 
income  changes  with  time  in  Canada.  Throughout  the  analysis  we  draw  comparisons  to  comparable 
outcomes of younger immigrants and the elderly native born.  
There is very little research on these issues,  as previous research  was focused differently on 
documenting low-income rates among all immigrants (Hou and Picot, 2002; Xu, 2002), inequality among 
immigrants (Zandvakili, 2002), or living arrangements of the elderly (Boyd, 1991; Basavarajappa, 1998 
and 1999).  Older immigrants have drawn more recent attention. In a series of papers for CIC, Dempsey 
(2004, 2005, and 2006) provides a statistical portrait of the incomes of elderly immigrants using income 
tax data.  She shows that income sources vary by both the class by which immigrants arrive in Canada 
and the number of years since their arrival, with most recent immigrants at the greatest disadvantage 
relative to immigrants who have been in Canada longest. Veall (2008) uses tax-based records from 2004 
to study the LIM rates of the elderly in Canada, and includes tabulations by immigrant status. While there 
are significant limitations of defining “family” income from the tax records, he finds very high LIM rates 
among recent immigrants.   Boyd  and  Kaida (2008)  use the 2001 PUMF  Census files to study links 
between ethnicity, immigrant status, living arrangements, and LICO status.  They also underscore the 
importance of elderly immigrants as a sub-population of the elderly poor. While most authors (e.g., Veall 
(2008) and Milligan (2008)) correctly point out that Canada has a relatively low rate of poverty among 
the elderly, and the trend in poverty rates is strikingly favourable, immigrants are an important exception.  
These studies point to important economic and policy questions concerning older immigrants. 
First, public pensions and transfer programs are often credited for a significant part of the decline in 
elderly poverty rates. However, older immigrants are often ineligible for these transfers (or can only 
collect a fraction of the benefits). Comparisons between immigrants and natives provide another potential 
dimension  by  which  to  evaluate  the  importance  of  such  programs.  Second,  in  the  absence  of  such 
transfers, older immigrants must support themselves in other ways. Strategies include working longer, or   3 
living with adult children. Third, these studies raise questions about Canadian immigration policy and the 
role of age in determining eligibility. 
In  our  analysis  of  recent  historical  immigration  patterns,  we  find  that  restrictions  on  elderly 
immigration have kept elderly immigrants to Canada at low levels as a proportion of total immigration. 
Government policy, in principle, makes it difficult for elderly immigrants to collect age-related or other 
social  transfers,  especially  in  their  first  ten  years  in  Canada.  In  practice,  total  income  from  public 
programs collected by the most recent immigrants (those with less than ten years in Canada) is found to 
be  significantly  higher  than  that  received  by  comparable  natives  in  the  60  to  64  age  group,  but 
significantly lower in the group aged 65 and older.  After ten years in Canada, total public transfers are 
similar for immigrants and natives, for both those aged 60-64, and those over 65. These patterns largely 
line up with what we would predict based on policy. For the 60-64 year olds, differences in transfers are 
driven by immigrants’ higher use of Social Assistance. For those over 65, the differences can be attributed 
to  OAS/GIS.  With  less  than  ten  years  in  Canada,  the  level  of  OAS/GIS  is  low  (but  not  zero)  for 
immigrants. When immigrants become eligible to collect a prorated level of OAS after residing in Canada 
for ten years, they also become eligible to “top up” their otherwise low OAS benefits with a “super” GIS.  
Taken together, our results suggest that elderly immigrants do make considerable use of government 
programs.  Nevertheless, low income rates are higher for many immigrants, especially those in Canada for 
less than ten years. 
Our  analysis  also  identifies  two  important  differences  between  the  outcomes  of  elderly 
immigrants in the 1980/90s and the 2000s.  First, in the most recent period we observe a deterioration in 
the relative outcomes of elderly immigrants (age 60-64 and 65+) who have been in Canada 10 to 19 years.  
Their income gap relative to the native born is higher, as is their low income rate (measured by LIM).  
Second, in the later period for the 65+ age group we observe significant increases in the employment rates 
of  the  native  born  and  immigrants  who  have  been  in  Canada  20+  years.    The  employment  rates  of 
immigrants of this age who have been in Canada less than 20 years actually fall.  Therefore, a “retirement 
gap” has emerged among these groups of the elderly.    4 
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we use administrative data to document the 
age  and  class  of  immigration  to  Canada  since  1980.  We  follow  this  in  Section  3  with  a  detailed 
description of the public policy pertaining to older immigrants: policies that directly affect admission, 
age-related income support programs, and their interaction. The fourth section contains our core empirical 
results: an analysis of the levels and composition of income by age and immigrant status. We use the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the years 1981 through 1997, and the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1997 through 2006. Throughout our analysis, we highlight differences in 
individual incomes between older immigrants and similar native-born Canadians, as well as differences in 
family incomes. Older immigrants have significantly different living arrangements than the native-born, 
and the family dimension makes a noticeable difference to their living standards. Even with help from 
their families, however, we find that older immigrants have significantly worse economic outcomes than 
comparable native-born. 
2.0  Patterns in the Age and Class of Immigrants to Canada 
In  Figures  1  through  5  we  explore  trends  in  the  class  composition  and  age  structure  of 
immigration to Canada.  Because the point system explicitly rewards youth and characteristics associated 
with  youth,  it  should  be  relatively  difficult  for  an  older  individual  to  enter  Canada  in  one  of  the 
economic/independent classes.  Instead, it is more likely that they would enter through the family class or 
the refugee class.  
Figure  1  shows  the  relative  share  of  immigrants  entering  through  the  refugee,  family  and 
economic classes over the last 25+ years.  While there is some variation in the refuges share, there is no 
dramatic  trend  over  the  period.    In  contrast,  starting  in  the  mid  1990s  the  share  of  economic  class 
immigrants expanded steadily while the share of family class immigrants declined. By 2000 a new steady 
state appears to have been reached where the economic class makes up more than 50 of all entrants and 
the family class just over one-quarter.   5 
In Figure 2 we graph the overall share of immigrants in two older age groups—aged 45-64 and 
aged 65+—over time.  The share aged 45-64 appears to regularly cycle between 10 and 15 percent.  The 
share aged 65+, which held steady around 5 percent until the mid 1990s has recently declined by roughly 
50 percent. 
Figures 3 and 4 relate the information in the previous two graphs.  Here the shares of each age 
group entering through the economic, family and refugee classes are graphed.  The shares of 45-64 year 
olds entering in the economic and family classes change quite dramatically over the period.  The share in 
the family class falls from near 75 percent to below 50 percent by the end of the period.  The share in the 
economic class rises from 20 percent to close to 50 percent.   In Figure 4 it is clear that the overwhelming 
majority of immigrants 65+ enter through the family class—over three-quarters of them in any year—
although there is a small nod to the trend towards more economic class immigrants at the end of the 
period.  In summary for most of our sample period the majority of either age group is not evaluated under 
the point system,
2  
Another perspective on this issue is provided in Figure 5.  Here we graph the shares of the family 
class represented by the older immigrant groups.  In many years older immigrants make up a significant 
fraction of this class, and average just under one-third more recently.   
Therefore, older immigrants are typically a significant fraction of family class immigrants, and as 
Figures 3 and 4 show the family class are, at least historically, the majority of older immigrants.  As 
explained in detail below, entrants by the family class are explicitly denied access to social assistance 
programs over their first ten years in Canada.  All immigrants in these age groups will have limited time 
to build up credit for OAS pension or CPP/QPP pensions.  While the recent overall trend is to a higher 
proportion of economic immigrants, the class shares tend to fluctuate over time.  For example, it is only in 
the last ten years that the economic class has represented the majority of all immigrants.   
                                                 
2 The remaining share enters through the refugee and “other” classes.   6 
 
3.0  Public Policy towards Older Immigrants 
 
3.1  Regulations Regarding Family Class Admission 
Individuals  wishing  to  sponsor  a  family  class  immigrant  must  be  either  citizens  or  permanent 
residents of Canada and at least 18 years of age.  Immigrants can apply for citizenship after 3 years 
residency in Canada.  Permanent residency is conferred when an immigrant receives their visa.   
The main categories of relatives who are eligible to be sponsored are  
  Fiancés, legal spouses and common law partners who are at least 16 years of age,  
  Natural and adopted dependent children (unmarried and under age 22 or a full time student or 
disabled),  
  Adoptees under age 18,  
  Parents, grandparents and brothers and sisters (unmarried and under 18 years old).   
There are also special provisions that permit the sponsorship of dependent relatives with no other means 
of support,
3 only relatives, or the last relative remaining abroad. Finally, more distant relatives may be 
indirectly sponsored by a given application.  For example, sponsored immigrants may be accompanied by 
their dependent.
4 
Sponsors  must  sign  a  contract  with  the  Ministry  of  Citizenship  and  Immigration  called  an 
“undertaking.”    This  contract  outlines  the  sponsor’s  promise  to  financially  support  the  sponsored 
immigrants  for  a  period  of  up  to  10  years.    The  contract  is  intended  to  ensure  that  the  sponsored 
immigrants do not become dependent on the Canadian social assistance system.  The support period is 
three years for spouses, common law partners or dependent children aged 22 or older and 10 years for 
dependent children under age 22
5 and all other sponsored immigrants.  The terms and conditions of the 
undertaking are presented in the appendix. 
                                                 
3 For example brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews or grandchildren who are orphaned, under 18 years of age and not a 
spouse or common-law partner. 
4 They may also be accompanied by dependent disabled persons. 
5 The period for these children is ten years or until age 25, whichever comes first.   7 
The sponsor also signs a Sponsorship Agreement with the sponsored immigrant.  This outlines 
their  mutual  obligations;  the  sponsor’s  commitment  to  support  the  sponsored  immigrants,  and  the 
sponsored immigrant’s commitment to make every effort to be self-supporting. 
In addition to the undertaking, sponsors must also demonstrate their ability to support the persons 
they have sponsored (as well as their dependents).  This is done by evidence of an income stream free of 
debts that exceeds the Low Income Cut-off for a household made up of their current dependents and the 
sponsored immigrants.  The incomes of several co-sponsors can be pooled to satisfy this test.  Finally, this 
income test is typically waived for spouses and dependent children. 
3.2  Immigrants’ Access to Canadian Social Assistance and Income Security Programs 
The undertaking at least nominally prohibits family class immigrants’ access to social assistance 
(SA) benefits for a period of up to 10 years.  Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) documentation 
stresses that the undertaking is a legal contract and that any violations of the terms could have legal 
implications including the repayment of any social benefits received.  That said, there is some evidence 
that family class immigrants do end up on social assistance within the support period. Thomas (1996) 
concludes that sponsorship default is “a significant and costly problem” in Toronto.  The social assistance 
rate among households headed by a sponsored family class immigrant was 13.9 percent in October 1994, 
just shy of the rate among the general population.  From another perspective, the author estimates that up 
to 17 percent of sponsorships agreements were in default and that this accounted for between 10 and 12 
percent of the social assistance caseload in Toronto at this time. 
All immigrants face limited access to other income support programs by program rules.  For the 
elderly,  three  of  the  most  important  programs  are  Old  Age  Security  (OAS),  the  Guaranteed  Income 
Supplement (GIS) and the Allowance.  Old Age Security is a demogrant, available to all individuals 
starting at age 65, subject to certain residency requirements (but not to any income test). It is not available 
to individuals who have been in Canada less than 10 years. For individuals under age 25 on July 1, 1977 
or anyone who did not live in Canada prior to July 1 1977 regardless of age,  
  A full pension is payable if the individual has lived in Canada for 40 years since age 18;   8 
  A prorated pension is payable to individuals with a minimum of 10 years of residence. 
The  prorating  fraction  is  min[YOR/40,1]  where  YOR  refers  to  years  of  residency  in  Canada.    For 
example, 20 years of residency would qualify an individual for one-half a pension.  Therefore, immigrants 
with less than 10 years residency are denied benefits and immigrants who have been in Canada for just 
over 10 years will receive very small pensions.
6  
Before July 1, 1977, there are different rules for individuals who were over 25-years-old: a full 
pension is payable with a minimum of 20 years of residence, while a prorated pension is not available.  
Therefore, the 1977 OAS reform involves a change that raises the full-benefit residence requirement from 
20 years to 40 years, and a change that provides a prorated benefit to elderly immigrants after 10 years of 
residence.  In principle, the second change benefits those who have been in Canada 10-19 years, while the 
first change derives disadvantages to those who have been in Canada 20-39 years.  
GIS is an income-tested supplement to the OAS pension.  Eligibility is conditional on being in 
receipt of a full OAS pension.  Since July 1984, however, new rules allow those in receipt of a partial 
OAS pension to receive a “super” GIS.  In fact, the rules provide additional income to these individuals to 
offset the short fall in their OAS pensions.  The maximum super GIS benefit is equal to the difference 
between a full OAS pension plus the maximum GIS benefit (given marital status and spouse's eligibility 
for  OAS  and  the  Allowance)  and  the  partial  OAS  pension  for  which  these  individuals  are  eligible.  
Therefore, these individuals are potentially made as financially well off as they would be if they were 
eligible for a full OAS pension. The major difference is that the full amount of the supplement is subject 
to a 50% income test, including the part that offsets the pro-rated OAS pension.  
Taken together with the 1977 OAS reform, the 1984 GIS reform clearly benefit those who have 
been  in  Canada  10-19  years.    These  immigrants  move  from  a  situation  of  no  financial  support  to  a 
situation of potentially receiving income equal to the sum of a full OAS pension and a full GIS benefit 
although a higher proportion of the transfer is income tested relative to the case of the native born. For 
                                                 
6 These residency criteria appear to be applied at the time of application.  Therefore, an individual eligible for a pro-
rated pension could increase their entitlement by delaying receipt.  Note, however, that at most YOR’s between 10 
and 40 the implied rate of increase in the pension is less than actuarially fair for people of this age.   9 
those who have been in Canada 20-39 years, the 1984 GIS reform potentially offsets the disadvantage of 
the OAS reform, again acknowledging that a higher proportion of the benefits is income tested.   
The 1984 reform appears to have had an unintended consequence for recent immigrants who 
came from a country with a social security agreement with Canada (Tamagno 2007).
7  Most of these 
agreements allow immigrants to use the sum of years participating in both their home country’s and 
Canada’s social security programs to establish eligibility for an OAS pension, although the amount of the 
benefit is calculated based solely on years in Canada.  Therefore, an immigrant who had participated in 
their home country program for at least nine years and who had at least one year in Canada would have 
the required 10 years for an OAS pension.  If the number of years in Canada were one they would receive 
1/40 of a full pension.  However, once in receipt of this partial OAS they became eligible for the super 
GIS to top up the missing OAS benefit.  Over time, sponsored immigrants from countries with social 
security agreements with Canada appeared to be using this route to qualify for small OAS pensions and 
large GIS benefits.  In effect, the partial OAS and super GIS benefit appeared to be taking the place of the 
financial support promised in the undertaking. 
In 1996 new rules were put in place to address this perceived abuse.  First, sponsored immigrants 
are no longer eligible GIS benefits, except in cases in which their sponsor is dead, is convicted of a 
criminal act involving the immigrant, is declared legally bankrupt or is imprisoned for a term of more 
than six months.  Second, a full GIS benefit is only available to persons who had been resident in Canada 
for 10 years.  Those with less than 10 years residency (but who qualified for a benefit through a social 
security agreement) would receive a pro-rated benefit.  Certain groups of immigrants were exempted from 
the new legislation.
8 
The Allowance is a program that provides benefits to individuals aged 60-64 who are married to 
an OAS pensioner, or to widows who are aged 60-64.  The maximum benefit is equivalent to the sum of a 
full OAS pension and GIS, and is subject to an income test in its entirety.  Sponsored legal or common 
                                                 
7 Our description of this episode follows Tamagno (2007). 
8 The old rules applied to individuals already in Canada by March 6, 1996 who 1) were in receipt of GIS (for as long 
as they were eligible for GIS) or 2) who might be eligible for a GIS in the future (but only to December 2000).   10 
law spouses or sponsored widows are not eligible for these benefits over the period their undertaking is in 
force.
9 
It  is  clear  then  that  many  of  these  regulations  reinforce  the  sponsor’s  responsibility  for  a 
sponsored  immigrant’s  welfare  over  an  initial  period  in  Canada.    The  remaining  restrictions  that 
emphasize  residency  appear  to  relate  an  individual’s  benefits  to  the  period  that  they  potentially 
contributed to Canadian tax coffers, but this intent is effectively undone for lower income individuals by 
the GIS reform. Over our period of interest the proportion of OAS pensioners in receipt of a GIS benefit 
trends downward from almost 53 percent in 1980 settling at just over 36 percent since 2000 (HRDC 
2007).  
Social Assistance (SA), often called “welfare,” helps people in need who are not eligible for other 
benefits.  As funded by provincial or municipal governments, eligibility rules and the amounts paid are 
different across regions.  
A final, major, public, source of income to seniors is the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans 
(CPP/QPP).  These are contributory pensions and benefits are related to an individual’s lifetime earnings.  
There are no special provisions for immigrants, although clearly their benefits will be directly related to 
the length of time they have lived and worked in Canada.  Benefits are available as early as age 60,
10 and 
eligibility is conditional on having made at least one valid contribution to the program.  
 
4.0 Empirical Analysis 
 
  We now turn to a detailed analysis of the incomes of older immigrants. Is there evidence that 
older immigrants have poor economic outcomes, and are unable to attain the living standards of similar-
aged Canadians, or other immigrants? Is there prima facie evidence that these a related immigrants 
restricted access to Canada’s Income Security programs? 
                                                 
9 The exceptions are 1) individuals who were receiving a pension in March 1996 or before; or 2) individuals who 
were residing in Canada or had resided in Canada as a Canadian citizen or permanent resident before March 7, 
1996 and will receive a pension in January 2001 or before. 
10 In early 1980s, the initial age for both the CPP and QPP was 65.  Starting in 1984 for Quebec, and in 1997 for 
other provinces in Canada, a new rule allows an individual to initial benefits as early as age 60.   11 
4.1 The Benchmark 
 
In order to measure the extent to which elderly immigrants are poor, or evaluate their access to 
income from government programs, we need a benchmark.  In most immigration research the native born 
are  used  as  a  reference  group  to  calibrate  the  behaviour  of  the  foreign  born  (e.g.,  the  economic 
assimilation  of  immigrants).    While  at  a  general  level  any  group  might  serve  this  purpose,  the 
requirements become stricter if the convergence of the immigrant and benchmark groups is supposed to 
have any meaning.  
In many dimensions the working assumption of Canada’s immigration system is that we do not 
want to admit individuals who turn out to be just like the native born.  To demonstrate this point we draw 
a sample of native-born males, aged 15 and over, from the 2001 individual files of the Canadian census, 
and evaluated them according to the point system applied to economic class immigrants in 2002.  In some 
dimensions our evaluation was likely overly generous, as all individuals received the maximum points for 
arranged employment (10 points) and adaptability (10 points).
11  That said, the average point total within 
this group was 64.3.  Citizenship and Immigration Canada adjusted the “passing” mark for skill-class 
immigration applicants from 75 to 67 on September 18, 2003.  According to the old threshold, the overall 
“failure” rate was 79 percent ranging from 95 percent for individuals aged 65+ to 66 percent for those 
aged 25-44.
12  Using the newer passing mark the overall failure rate falls to 45 percent.  In either case, the 
point system attempts to select individuals who are more like a minority, rather than a majority, of the 
native born. 
A similar point is implied by the restrictions imposed on family class immigrants.  As described 
above,  these  immigrants  are  denied  access  to  social  assistance  programs  over  their  first  10  years  in 
                                                 
11 We assign zero point in experience to individuals who worked mainly part-time weeks in 2000 or to those who 
were not working in 2001.  Presumably a fairer allocation of the points for arranged employment would take 
account of the unemployment and non participation rates of males in different age groups.  Adaptability takes 
account of spouse’s education as well as the presence of family in Canada, and previous years of labour market 
experience  or  post  secondary  education  in  Canada.    The  census  data  does  not  have  sufficient  information  to 
account for these factors. The implementation of the point system follows the self assessment test available at 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/index.html.  
12 One reason for this result is that points for education include both degree and years of schooling requirements.  In 
the census data some individuals satisfied the degree requirements but not the years requirement.   12 
Canada.  There are few segments of the native born population in which the social assistance participation 
rate is zero. 
While these points argue for holding immigrants to a higher standard than the native born, luck 
both good and bad also plays a roll in people’s economic status.  Furthermore, any researcher who has 
estimated a standard human capital earnings equation knows that the inputs to the point system explain at 
best a minority of the cross section variation in labour market outcomes.   
In our analysis we use the native-born as one of our points of comparison lacking an obvious, 
better alternative.  Given the preceding discussion, however, it is difficult to know whether convergence 
(or similarity) in the behaviour of the native and foreign born should be viewed as a positive or negative 
development.  This  discussion  also  points  to  another  important  caveat  of  interpretation:  the  potential 
difficulty of extrapolating results from current immigrants to future elderly immigrants. The current older 
immigrants are highly selected. Family sponsors must also be able to financially support their parents 
before  they  are  allowed  to  immigrate.  Thus,  only  higher  income  sponsoring  families,  and  elderly 
immigrants  with  decent  income  potential,  can  participate  in  the  current  family  program.    Elderly 
immigrants are thus “double” positively selected by both the government (as explained above) and the 
sponsoring family. 
4.2  The Basic Idea 
Our primary objective is to document the living standards of older immigrants, and to trace their 
means of financial support.  The analysis is, in principle, quite simple: we look directly at the various 
income  sources  and  totals,  for  older  immigrants,  comparing  them  to  native-born  elderly.  Our  main 
statistical  tool  will  be  a  comparison  of  means  across  various  age-immigrant  group  cells,  either  with 
straight (unadjusted) averages, or by regression analysis.  The two main age groups we investigate are: 
•  Men  aged  60  to  64  (A6064):  these  men  are  approaching  retirement,  not  yet  eligible  to  collect 
OAS/GIS. Those with enough years of work experience can also collect CPP/QPP and retire early. 
Men in this age group, especially if they have low skills, may have relatively weak earnings potential   13 
or labor force attachment. For newly arrived immigrants, the problems of being an older worker may 
be compounded. On the other hand, they are less likely to have pensions and other sources of income 
that facilitate retirement. 
•  Men aged 65 and older (A65P): these men are normally retired, collecting their full entitlements to 
CPP/QPP and OAS/GIS, as well as private pensions. For this group, we expect the differences in 
outcomes between the native-born and immigrant populations to be most stark. 
We also subdivide the immigrants into different sub-samples, depending on how long they have lived in 
Canada: 
•  New immigrants, who have lived in Canada from 0 to 9 years (YSM09, or I1): These immigrants, 
with YSM between 0 and 9 years, are most affected by the government restrictions on OAS/GIS. 
Some proportion of them are also covered by family commitments through the undertaking. At the 
same  time,  these  new  immigrants  may  have  the  same  problems  as  other  younger  immigrants  to 
Canada, facing difficulties in earning wages at the same level as comparable native-born. 
•  Intermediate immigrants, who have lived in Canada from 10 to 19 years (YSM1019, or I2): Many of 
these immigrants will be eligible for at least a partial OAS/GIS, and may also have accumulated some 
years of work experience towards the CPP/QPP. At the same time, they may be less able to rely on 
younger family members. 
•  Longtime immigrants, who arrived in Canada more than 20 years ago (YSM20P, or I3): This group, 
with YSM greater than or equal to 20, may have similar outcomes to the native born. Under certain 
restrictive assumptions, this group of immigrants provides evidence as to the outcomes that older 
immigrants may experience, the longer they are in Canada. 
While  we  will  be  comparing  outcomes  across  these  three  groups  of  immigrants,  only  some  of  the 
difference in outcomes can be attributed purely to differences in time lived in Canada (YSM). Some of 
the differences may also stem from cohort effects. We do not attempting to disentangle the dynamic 
“YSM” effects from the more permanent immigrant arrival effects.   14 
  Throughout  our  analysis,  we  can  therefore  compare  the  outcomes  of  immigrants  of  different 
vintages each other and to the native-born. The other dimension in which we can draw comparisons is 
across age groups: younger immigrants (i.e., 50 year olds) who have been in Canada a similar number of 
years, have probably faced similar economic conditions and difficulties in adjusting to life in Canada, as 
the older immigrants. In this sense, we can identify immigrant-specific “age effects.” 
  A final line of comparison is between individual and family-level incomes (and outcomes). For 
the native-born, the distinction may not be important (for men), except to the extent that income (or lack 
thereof) from their wives may affect the living standards of men. For older immigrants, especially those 
who have been sponsored, and if they are living with their adult children, family living standards may be 
much better than what we would conclude on the basis of individual income alone. Indeed, Boyd and 
Kaida (2008), using the 2001 census, suggest that family support can offset low incomes (private and 
transfers) earned by the elderly immigrants themselves. 
4.3  The Data Sources 
Our analysis is based on two surveys.  First, The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1981 to 
1997, gathered annually
13 by Statistics Canada until 1997.  This survey is nationally representative, with 
the individual files covering between 66,000 and 90,000 individuals over the age of 15 each year.  The 
survey details various income sources at the individual level, allowing tracking the of individual income 
composition over time, for both immigrants and native-born Canadians.  The series of SCFs ends in 1997, 
making it necessary to extend our inference to post-1997 years using other data. In this paper, we employ 
the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), in which categories of major income sources are 
typically kept identical to those in the SCF.
14 We use the SLID for the years 1997 through 2006. 
   There  are  at  least  two  major  discontinuities  between  the  two  surveys  that  limit  comparisons 
between them.  First, starting in 1999, all income of social assistance is assigned to the female spouse in 
                                                 
13 The SCF lacks the survey in 1983, which is the only missing year from 1981 to 1997. 
14 The SLID is not necessarily the best data set to extend the SCF in other categories.  For example, Robb et al. 
(2003) find that  the Labour Force Survey (LFS)  serves as a better extension of the  SCF series in  terms of 
information about wage and education.   15 
the SLID data.  Since our empirical analysis focuses on males aged 65 or older, and the social assistance 
is a major public program that provides cash transfers to recent elderly immigrants, this change makes it 
difficult to merge the values of social assistance from the two surveys at the individual level. To some 
extent, we are able to deal with this by looking at household, as well as individual-level data. Second, the 
sample  sizes  are  smaller  in  the  SLID  than  the  SCF.  Especially  as  we  are  focusing  on  a  small  sub-
population (e.g., newly arrived immigrants over 65 years old), this leads to some very small cell sizes. 
This largely explains why we ultimately pool samples across years. 
4.4  The Regression Specification 
While the raw averages across groups will be informative, our main results are based on the 
regression-adjusted estimates. Our basic regression specification for the SCF sample is:   
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Notation  Definition 
 yit   •  The dependent variable for individual i at time t. 
 
AGEGij   •  An indicator of whether individual i is in age group j: 20-29; 30-
44; 60-64; 65+ (j = 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). The omitted age 
group is age 45-59. 
 YSMki   •  A dummy indicating whether an individual is in a given 
immigrant cohort (I1 (YSM09); I2 (YSM1019); I3 (YSM20p). 
Native-born are the omitted (base) group. 
 YDit   •  A vector of year dummies 
 LOCli  •  An indicator of whether an individual lives in a given location 
(province × city-type). 
   D8678it   •  An indicator for years 1986, 87, and 88; it is used to capture the 
abnormal peak of SA income during the three years. a 
   16 
Because we are pooling across time periods, it is important to adjust as much as possible for year-effects. 
To the extent that immigrant characteristics are also changing over time (e.g., YSM and age are both 
increasing over time), it is important to try and disentangle these effects in a multivariate setting. It also 
permits  us  to  control  for  regional  effects,  as  prices  and  incomes  vary  across  locations:  some  of  the 
differences between immigrants and natives may be understated, since immigrants are more likely to live 
in  high  income,  high  price  cities,  compared  to  the  native  elderly.  We  would  therefore  like  to  base 
comparisons on within-location differences in outcomes. The regression also allows us to more formally 
test hypotheses concerning differences across various groups.  The specification for the SLID sample is 
almost identical: 
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The only difference is that we do not control for the 1986-87-88 spike. 
The regression equations have two key components: (1) The base age profile that applies to both 
immigrants  and  natives  ( j   );  and  (2)  the  base  differences  across  immigrant  groups  ( k   )  and  the 
immigrant-specific age profiles, (
 
 kj ).  The base age profile applies directly to natives, but is also the 
“base” for immigrants.  If there are changes in the dependent variable with age, the t-value on the  j   will 
reflect the significance.  This allows us to see how income varies across the life-cycle, between older 
Canadians  and  younger  Canadians  (i.e.,  what  components  of  income  are  “age-related”?)  The  set  of 
coefficients  kj    – the coefficients on interactions of  ki YSM  with age groups – give the specific effects in 
age profile for immigrants of  ki YSM , compared to natives of the same ages.  Are the age-profiles steeper 
or flatter for immigrants? The base immigrant-effect is given by  k   , the coefficient on the immigrant 
indicator.  Combining the immigrant-specific effect in age profile and the base immigrant-effect, the total 
difference  between  the  outcome  i y   for  an  immigrant  of  a  given  age,  and  a  same-aged  native-born   17 
individual  is  given  by  the  sum,  k kj     + .  We  report  whether  the  estimated  difference  is  statistically 
significantly different from zero (at the 5% level), i.e., whether immigrants of a given age have different 
outcomes than similar aged natives. To simplify the notation throughout the paper, we denote the three 
immigrant  groups  by  YSM09,  YSM1019,  and  YSM20P.  In  the  tables,  the  corresponding  immigrant 
groups are labeled I1, I2, and I3, respectively.   
For both samples, we pool across years. This forces the age and YSM coefficients to be constant 
across time, and impedes our ability to explore trends in the basic patterns. There is no question we would 
rather allow interactions between time and our key age-immigrant coefficients. Unfortunately, the sample 
sizes are too small to permit the identification of a trend (let alone year effects). The small samples also 
reduce our ability to look at a number of within-group questions, notably the variance of outcomes among 
older immigrants. In future research, we expect the full census files to be helpful in addressing these 
questions. That said, we can look at one time-dimension: the SLID versus the SCF. Assuming the surveys 
are otherwise comparable, differences in the two samples may reflect differences across the two broad 
time periods: 1980s to mid-1990s, and the mid-1990s to the present. The pooled samples each allow us to 
relatively precisely measure “long run” differences in incomes across the immigrant-age cells. 
4.5 Results 
A: Means (SCF, 1986 to 1997) 
Table 1 shows mean differences for a “balance sheet” of income sources for men aged 65 and 
older, for native-born and the three immigrant groups, using data from SCF.  It is divided into three 
panels: (1) In the top panel we report the unconditional mean incomes by source; (2) In the middle panel 
we report the proportion of individuals that have a particular source of income; and (3) In the bottom 
panel we show the corresponding unconditional family per capita mean income for the individual: low 
income seniors may, for example, live with high income children, and thus have higher living standards 
than would be suggested by their individual income.   18 
  We  begin  with  “private”  sources  of  income  to  distinguish  from  tax  financed  sources.    Total 
Earnings include earnings from wage, salaries, or self-employment, and are thus related to labour market 
activity.  Just over 14 percent of the native-born have income from this source, earning a total of $3,162 
per year. Immigrants are less likely to work to varying degrees (negligible for YSM20P).  More recent 
immigrants earn less, but perhaps surprisingly the most recent group earns more on average those in 
Canada 10 to 20 years. Turning to investment income, recent immigrants earn substantially less than the 
native born (by almost $1700 per year), but immigrants who lived in Canada more than 20 years earn 
more. One category where new immigrants do earn more than the native-born (and other immigrants) is 
in “Other Private Income.” It is difficult to identify the precise source of this difference.  A plausible 
candidate, however, is public-pension income from abroad.  Finally, newer immigrants earn less than half 
as much money from private pensions as the native-born: over half of the native-born earn receive private 
pensions, compared to 25% and 35% for immigrants who have been in the country 0-9 and 10-19 years. 
The gap in pensions alone contributes over $5000 to the gap between the incomes of new immigrants and 
the native-born.  Tallying together the various sources of private income, new immigrants earn about 
$4400 less than the native-born, and immigrants who lived 10-19 years in Canada have a larger  ($6000) 
gap. There is no appreciable gap between the native-born and immigrants who have been in Canada a 
long time. 
  We  next  turn  to  public  sources  of  income.    The  first  is  CPP/QPP,  which  is  a  contributory 
program, so that benefits are based on past contributions.  Not surprisingly, native-born earn the most 
from CPP/QPP, while the most recent immigrants earn the least.  This adds about $4,500 to the income 
gap between the native-born relative to recent immigrants, and over $2,000 to the gap between natives 
and medium-term immigrants. 
  A  second  set  of  public  sources  is  the  various  transfer  programs.    Social  Assistance  (SA) 
participation rates are much higher for immigrants than the native-born elderly: 18 percent of the native-
born receive SA, compared to 27 percent of YSM09, and 34 percent of YSM1019. The unconditional 
mean benefits are around $1,500 for recent immigrants, compared to $200 for native-born, and over $500   19 
for YSM1019.  There are negligible differences in the level of EI benefits, though the magnitude of this 
program is relatively small for the elderly (given the employment history requirement, and that they are 
mostly retired).  There is, however, a striking difference in the OAS/GIS benefits received by immigrants 
and natives.  The native-born elderly receive on average $7,000 per year.  Because they are not generally 
eligible,  very  few  recent  immigrants  (YSM0-10)  receive  OAS  benefits,  and  the  unconditional  mean 
benefit is only $850 (a difference of over $6000).  Immigrants who have been in Canada 10-19 years will 
only qualify for a pro-rated (reduced) level of OAS. However, they receive even a higher level of total 
benefits as the native-born (($7500).  While we cannot confirm it in this table, presumably this is due to 
program rules that provide higher GIS benefits to offset lost OAS benefits to those in receipt of a partial 
OAS pension.  Also, this group is entitled to lower levels of CPP/QPP and again absent other sources of 
income the income tested GIS benefit will help make up the difference.  Therefore, it appears that lower 
OAS pensions (and CPP/QPP) are offset to some extent for the immigrant elderly of both YSM09 and 
YSM1019.  For YSM1019 the offset is intentionally provided by the GIS, while for YSM09 the offset is 
effectively provided by social assistance.  Note that in the latter case this has the effect (to some extent) of 
“downloading” support for recent elderly immigrants to municipalities and provincial governments. 
  Taken  together,  the  most  recent  elderly  immigrants  receive  just  less  than  half  as  much 
government  support  as  the  native-born.  To  the  extent  that  some  of  this  income  comes  from  social 
assistance, and these immigrants are admitted primarily through the family class, the family sponsorship 
program does not appear to be working as intended. Also notable is that immigrants who have been in 
Canada longer (10-19 years) receive more transfer income than the native-born.  This suggests that their 
limited time in Canada does is not enough to allow them to accumulate enough retirement income from 
other sources to support themselves in old age.  
  In the last row of this panel, we report the levels of total income. Elderly native-born earn about 
$30,600  per  year,  compared  to  about  $17,100  for  recent  immigrants,  and  $22,800  for  medium-term 
immigrants.    Long-term  immigrants  have  almost  identical  incomes  to  the  native-born.  For  elderly 
immigrants who have not been in Canada very long (at least 20 years), there is thus a sizeable difference   20 
between their incomes and similar aged-native-born. The difference of $8,000-$13,000 could easily lead 
to substantial differences in living standards.  
Because elderly immigrants live in extended households, we may get a more accurate picture of 
their living standards by looking at the income levels of the households in which they reside. In the last 
panel we report means of per capita income.  One striking result is that the move to the per capita measure 
eliminates most of the differences across groups in private income.  For example, where the most recent 
immigrants have much lower private income compared to natives on an individual level, at the household 
level the per capita amounts are very similar for the two groups.   
Differences across groups in transfer income remain in the per capita figures, so that per capita 
total income for households with elderly new immigrants is still lower than that for the native-born. 
However, the gap is considerably smaller when we use family, as opposed to individual income as our 
measure of living standards. That said, simple per capita calculations are probably too crude for general 
welfare comparisons, especially if the immigrant households also have children, or if there are economies 
of scale in consumption. More sophisticated adjustments can be made (see, for example  Deaton and 
Paxson, 1998), and these adjustments may be important.
15 But the basic point is unlikely to change: older 
immigrants lower incomes are partially offset by the incomes of family members. 
The average family size for the native-born is about 2 people (i.e., a husband and his wife), while 
it is almost double, at 3.7 people for elderly new immigrants. Even those elderly who lived 10-19 years in 
Canada live in relatively large families (3 people per household). Further research is required before we 
can document the precise nature of these family arrangements. It seems reasonable to assume, however, 
that these immigrants are living with adult relatives (e.g., sponsoring children).  
One  measure  of  “welfare”  that  does  take  living  arrangements  (family  structure)  into  at  least 
partial account is the Statistics Canada measure of “Low Income” (LIM). The LIM is based on the median 
                                                 
15  In addition to Deaton and Paxson 1998, see Deaton (1997), Deaton and Muellbauer (1986), and Rothbarth (1943) 
for a discussion of issues of welfare measurement when family structure varies by age (and along other systematic 
dimensions). The full census files provide an excellent resource for extending our analysis in this dimension, as the 
larger census data sets permit better measurement of family arrangements.   21 
adjusted family income in Canada.
16  Household have income “below the LIM” if their income is below 
the LIM level. Adjustments are made for family size, as well as the number of children, in order to 
partially control for differences of “needs” across families with different age-composition and size. Given 
the difference by immigrant status, this is a consequential adjustment. As shown in the last rows of Table 
1,  only  3.5%  of  native-born  Canadians  have  income  below  the  national  after  tax  LIM  (for  all  age 
groups!). This compares to 22% of households with recent elderly immigrants. Note that this implies that 
22% of older recent immigrants live in poor households. One interesting question is whether these are the 
richer or poorer of immigrant households. The SLID and SCF sample sizes are too small to answer this 
question.
17 The LIM rate of the YSM1019 group is still double that of the native-born, but at 6.8% is not 
nearly as large as the rate for recent immigrants. Immigrants who have lived in Canada a long time have 
very low LIM rates (2.4%). 
 
B: Means (SLID, 1997 to 2006) 
  In Table 2 we show the comparable results for the SLID sample. Rather than repeat results that 
are the same in the two surveys, we just highlight results that are noticeably different than in the SCF 
sample. Note that differences may be due to differences in the time period, or the surveys. 
The gap in private income is larger in the SLID than the SCF, driven largely by a growing gap in 
pension income. The native-born earn over $13,000 in private pension income (over 50% higher than the 
SCF sample), while pensions for recent immigrants are still relatively small ($4,700).  Also, the other 
private income of the most recent immigrants is much smaller in the SLID.  If this income is capturing 
foreign pension income, this may be related to the changing source country composition of Canadian 
immigration.   More recent immigrants may be more likely to have come from countries without well 
developed systems of public and private pensions. 
                                                 
16 See Milligan (2008) for a detailed discussion of the LIM headcount rate as a measure of “poverty,” as well as 
other possible poverty-lines. We thank Kevin for providing his time-consistent set of before and after-tax LIMs that 
cover the span of the period of our analysis. 
17 This is another example of extensions and future research that can exploit the full-sample census.    22 
The employment rates of both the native born and the YSM20+ immigrants are 9 to 10 percentage 
points higher than in the SLID, but the  employment rates of the  more recent immigrants are lower.  
Therefore, there is a retirement gap for the more recent immigrants that we did not see in the SCF data.  
The gap in CPP/QPP benefits is about the same magnitude (although the gap for YSM1019 is now 
much larger), and there remains a large gap in Social Assistance income, even with the problems of SA 
assignment in the SLID. Recent immigrants collect about $900 more SA income. 
Recent immigrants (YSM09) collect very little OASGIS compared to everyone else (as before). The 
level of OASGIS collected by YSM1019 is again higher than the level for the native-born. It seems that 
the GIS is fully offsetting reductions based on OAS eligibility. 
For family incomes, labour earnings are much more important for immigrant elderly (as in the SCF). 
Per capita earnings are almost $6000 higher per capita for recent immigrants (compared to natives), even 
while individual earnings are lower for immigrants. Thus, the gap in living standards would be at least  
$6000 greater if it wasn’t for the earnings of other family members (a simple measure of the importance 
of living arrangements to the wellbeing of older immigrants).  Also, once again moving to the per capita 
measure evens out the levels of private income across groups.  
Family sizes are even larger for immigrants (compared to natives) in the SLID (4.5 family members, 
compared  to  2.0  for  native-born).    Finally,  the  percentage  of  recent  elderly  immigrants  living  in 
households below the LIM is almost the same as the SCF: 20.1%.  What is new here is the higher rate for 




  Tables 3A and 3B show the regression results based on the SCF, while Tables 4A and 4B show 
the corresponding coefficients based on the SLID sample. We report the main regression coefficients in 
these tables. As can be seen, there are a lot of coefficients. As previously noted, the age-coefficients 
A6064 and A65P show the base age-profiles, i.e., how much income changes as someone becomes turns 
60 to 64, or becomes older than 65, compared to when they were 45-59 (setting aside age and cohort   23 
effects).  For Earnings (in Table 3A), for example, we see that earnings drop by $21,600 as someone ages 
to A6064 (e.g., early or partial retirement), and $40,500 by age A65P (full retirement). The interactions 
between immigrant status and the age profile show  the extent to which immigrant outcomes  change 
differentially than the native-born. For earnings, we see that the interaction effect for YSM09 (I1) and 
A6064 is not significantly different than zero. This means that earnings drop for new immigrants (turning 
60-64) as much as for natives (i.e., there is no offsetting behavior for new immigrants). For the YSM1019 
group, however, their interaction effect is positive, suggesting that compared to similar aged native-born, 
these older immigrants have a smaller drop in earnings as they age. It also implies that the “age penalty” 
for earnings is smaller for the YSM1019 immigrants than for native-born. For immigrants of this vintage 
over 65 years old, there is no difference from the native-age profile. In the last column of Table 3A, we 
report results for Total Income. Total income drops for everyone as they age: about $11,600 for A6064, 
and $20,400 for A65P. For recent immigrants, the “age penalty” is even greater among men aged 60 to 64 
(by over $5,500). In other words, while acknowledging that older men have lower incomes than younger 
men, and newer immigrants have lower incomes than the native born, recent immigrants aged 60-64 have 
even lower incomes. For recent immigrant men over 65, their incomes only drop as much as the native 
born: in other words, their immigrant status does not compound with their age: like younger immigrants 
their incomes are much lower than natives, and like older natives, their income is lower than young 
immigrants. 
In  order  to  determine  whether  these  results  imply  net  differences  in  outcomes  between 
immigrants and natives, we need to add the base immigrant effect to the age-immigrant interaction. We 
test and report the combined differences between immigrants and natives for each vintage of immigrants, 
as well, for both A6064 and A65P. The results are reported in Tables 5 (SCF) and Table 6 (SLID).  It is 
on those results that we will focus our discussion  
  The first column of Table 5 shows the adjusted difference in incomes between recent immigrants 
aged 60 to 64, and similarly aged native-born (based on the SCF).  The difference in earnings is over 
$16,000 (and statistically significant). Combining sources of private income, there is just over a $24,000   24 
gap. That is a very large difference, and reflects a combination of factors, including very poor labour 
market opportunities.  These immigrants are in no position to retire, yet they also have low earnings 
opportunities. 
This group of immigrants also collects considerably more social assistance (almost $800 per year 
more than natives). That is essentially the only form of transfer income that they can collect.  Summing 
across all sources, these individuals have almost $25,000 less income than the native-born. The results 
based on family per capita incomes are slightly less bleak: the gap falls to $15,700 per year, mostly 
because these elderly live in households with a lower private-income “penalty.”   Finally, the percentage 
of these individuals below the LIM is quite high: 7 percentage points higher than the native born. 
The  second  column  reports  the  results  for  the  medium-term  immigrants  of  the  same  age  group 
(A6064). This group is in a much better position, based on a swing of over $20,000 in private income. 
Immigrants  in  the  YSM1019  category  earn  $4700  more  than  native-born  and  they  collect  fewer 
government transfers. Overall their net individual income is lower than comparable natives by $4,000 
(although this is insignificantly different than zero). For these immigrants, family living arrangements 
make less of a difference (given the relatively positive individual incomes) than for the YSM09. Indeed, 
they live in families with essentially the same per capita incomes as the native-born, and their LIM rates 
are lower than natives. Finally, the third column shows results for longer-term immigrants: immigrants of 
this vintage generally have better outcomes than comparably aged natives. 
  The last three columns show the regression-adjusted results for men aged A65P that ought to line 
up with the results from Table 1. For the  YSM09 immigrants, we continue to see economically and 
statistically significantly lower private incomes, higher SA benefits, and much lower OASGIS benefits. 
Overall, the total income gap with natives is a substantial $19,500. As in Table 1, the family income 
results  greatly  equalize  the  difference  in  private  income  for  this  group.    There  remains  a  sizeable 
($12,000) total income gap, and an after tax LIM rate 20 percentage points higher than the native born. 
For the YSM1019 immigrants, the most notable finding is their significantly higher collection of transfer 
income (especially OASGIS  and SA). As  with the YSM09 immigrants, their family income paints a   25 
relatively better picture, though their LIM rate is still almost 5 percentage points higher than the native-
born. 
  In Table 6 we report the comparable results based on the SLID. What is new here for the A6064 
group is that now both the YSM09 and YSM1019 immigrant groups have significantly worse outcomes 
than the native-born (not just the YSM09). The YSM09 total income gap is larger, despite the fact that 
their relative receipt of SA benefits has grown. Moving to the family level again lessens the difference 
because on a per capita basis the earnings deficit is smaller.  For the YSM1019 group there is a new much 
larger deficit in private income.  This appears to be related to a much larger deficit in pension income and 
earnings below the level for the native born.  The proportion of families in this group below the LIM is 
also higher than in the SCF, although the difference is not statistically significant.
18  
For the A65P group, we find significantly worse outcomes in the SLID than the SCF, for both 
YSM09 and especially the YSM1019 group. Even at the family level the per capita total income deficit of 
the YSM1019 group is almost twice as large as it was in the SCF. The poverty rates implied by the LIM 
are about the same for the YSM09 but twice as large for the YSM1019. Clearly, more recent immigrants 
over 65 years old are doing very poorly in terms of living standards, despite collecting more transfer 
income (especially OASGIS for the YSM1019 immigrants, and SA for the YSM09 immigrants). 
5.0  Conclusions 
5.1   Summary 
  As noted in the introduction, government policy explicitly discourages the immigration of older 
individuals and curtails their participation in government programs if they do enter Canada.  To some 
extent  these  policies  appear  to  work  as  they  are  intended.    Elderly  individuals  represent  a  smaller 
proportion among immigrants than they do within the native-born population.  Recently arrived older 
immigrants have lower levels of transfer income.  
                                                 
18 We have some concerns about the distinction between YSM09 and YSM1019 in the SLID samples, and are 
investigating whether the SLID results are robust (for example, comparing results to the census).   26 
For the most recent YSM09 immigrants within the A65P age group this means lower levels of OAS 
and GIS.  Both the YSM09 and YSM1019 immigrants within this age group naturally have lower levels 
of CPP/QPP.  While the restrictions on access to income security benefits for these immigrants are not 
arbitrary, they have a predictable consequence: they contribute to lower income for these groups.  These 
negative income effects are mitigated to some extent by both government policy and individual action.  
The super GIS unravels the residency restrictions on OAS benefits and likely lies behind relatively high 
levels of OAS/GIS benefits for YSM1019 immigrants.   YSM09 immigrants have higher levels of social 
assistance benefits. Finally both these groups of immigrants fare better on a per capita family basis as 
larger family sizes  compensate for much of their deficit in private income.   Despite these offsetting 
effects, these older immigrants live in significantly poorer households than native-born Canadians. The 
after tax LIM rate for the most recent immigrants is about 20 percentage points higher then the rate for the 
native-born. For long-term immigrants (YSM20+), there are no disadvantages, suggesting that 20 years in 
Canada is enough to achieve parity with the native-born (over 65). 
We also observe large income gaps for immigrants who are 60-64 years of age. This is especially 
true  for  the  most  recent  immigrants,  and  appears  to  be  driven  mostly  by  low  earnings.  The  recent 
immigrants of this age also collect higher levels of social assistance.  There is also a growing gap in 
private pension income, reflecting the higher levels of pension income for native-born Canadians, and 
possibly  the  growing  tilt  of  immigration  towards  countries  where  private  pensions  are  unusual  (i.e., 
developing countries). 
While our ability to discern trends over time is frustrated by small sample sizes a number of 
differences between the SCF and SLID samples stand out. First, the medium term immigrants appear 
significantly worse off in the most recent data.  In the earlier data their overall outcomes were not far off 
the native born, but more recently they sit somewhere between the outcomes of the native born and the 
most recent immigrants.  We observe this development for both the 60-64 and 65P age groups.  Second, a 
“retirement gap” has emerged in the SLID data between the recent and medium term immigrants on one 
hand, and the native born and longer-term immigrants on the other.   This is due to a strong increase in the   27 
employment of the latter group in the SLID data.  One possible explanation of this development is that a 
higher portion of the transfer income of more recent immigrants is income tested; ether SA or the super 
GIS.  This imposes high marginal tax rates on additional earnings for this group.  Regardless of the 
reasons for this development it further contributes to income differences across these groups 
  While the results of our analysis are fairly straightforward, their implications for policy are not.  
There is a certain appeal in restricting access to income security programs that are implicitly funded on 
life cycle tax payment or explicit contributions.  It could become very costly to simply allow new entrants 
to Canada instant access to these programs.  That said, our analysis suggests that restricting access to 
these programs has direct implications for the economic welfare of new immigrants.  As noted in our 
introduction, “While each of these policies would appear to discourage the immigration of elderly persons 
who might end up poor, they also potentially condemn those elderly immigrants who nevertheless find 
themselves in this state”. 
  Our results also suggest a number of important paths for future research. The small sample sizes 
in the SCF and SLID impose a binding constraint on our ability to explore heterogeneity of outcomes 
among older immigrants, and to better compare older immigrants to other immigrant groups (especially 
along  dimensions  of  family  structure).  The  small  sample  sizes  also  make  it  difficult  to  draw  sharp 
inferences concerning trends, or time patterns. These are questions that can be better addressed using the 
full samples of the censuses.  Given our findings about the importance of family structure, one clear 
question for future research concerns the role of immigrant families – and the consequences for these 
families – in supporting elderly relatives. Finally, while there are severe data limitations, as Milligan 
(2008) notes, consumption data can paint a different picture of poverty than income, especially taking 
housing  into  account.  To  the  extent  that  consumption  and  expenditure  data  have  information  on 
immigrant status, it would be worth exploring the interactions between family structure, housing, and the 
resulting poverty levels of older immigrants. Our results based on income may understate the true extent 
of poverty among elderly immigrants, and any adverse effect of their support on sponsoring families.    28 
6.0  References 
Alan,  Sule;  Crossley,  Thomas  F.;  Grootendorst,  Paul  and  Veall,  Michael  R.  “The  Effects  of  Drug 
Subsidies on out-of-Pocket Prescription Drug Expenditures by Seniors: Regional Evidence from Canada.” 
Journal of Health Economics, 2002, 21, pp. 805-26. 
 
Basavarajappa, K.G. “Distribution, Inequality and Concentration of Income among Older Immigrants in 
Canada, 1990,” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper 115, Statistics Canada, 1999. 
 
____.  “Living  Arrangements  and  Residential  Overcrowding:  The  Situation  of  Older  Immigrants  in 
Canada, 1991,” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper 115, Statistics Canada, 1998. 
 
Boyd, Monica (1991): “Immigration and Living Arrangements: Elderly Women in Canada,” International 
Migration Review, Volume xxv, No. 1, pages 4-26. 
 
Boyd, Monica and Lisa Kaida (2008): “Falling Out of Safety Nets or Saved by Family Ties? Ethnicity, 
Immigrant Status and Poverty Among the Elderly,” Manuscript, Department of Sociology, University of 
Toronto.  
 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and 
Temporary Residents, Research and Evaluation Branch. 
 
Callocott, Martin. “Canada's Immigration Policy: The Need for Major Reform,” Public Policy Sources 
#64. The Fraser Institute, 2002. 
 
Deaton,  Angus.  The  Analysis  of  Household  Surveys:  A  Microeconometric  Approach  to  Development 
Policy. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1997. 
 
Deaton, Angus and Muellbauer, John. “On Measuring Child Costs: With Applications to Poor Countries.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4), pp. 720-44. 
 
Deaton, Angus and Paxson, Christina. “Measuring Poverty among the Elderly,” in D. A. Wise, editor, 
Inquiries in the Economics of Aging. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 169-200. 
 
Dempsey, Colleen. (2006), Immigrant Income and the Family, CIC Report. 
 
Dempsey, Colleen (2005):  Elderly Immigrants in Canada: Income Sources and Self-Sufficiency,  CIC 
Report. 
 
Dempsey, Colleen. (2004) “Elderly Immigrants in Canada: Income Sources and Composition”. Horizons, 
Policy Research Initiative, Vol.2, No.7. 
 
Gray  David  Gray;  Jeffrey  Mills;  Sourushe  Zandvakil “ Immigration,  Assimilation  and  Inequality  of 
Income Distribution in Canada”, mimeo, 2003. 
 
Hou, Feng and Picot, Garnett. “Do Changes in Low-Income Rates among Immigrants Account for Rising 
Low-Income in Canada?,” Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, Statistics Canada, 2002. 
 
Human  Resources  Development  Canada.  The  CPP  &  OAS  Stats  Book  2007,  
www.sdc.gc.ca/en/isp/statsitics/statmain.shtml (accessed Monday March 31, 2008) 2007.   29 
 
Milligan, Kevin (2008): “The Evolution of Elderly Poverty in Canada,” Canadian Public Policy, Volume 
34, Supplement, pages 79-94. 
 
Pendakur, Krishna. “Consumption Poverty in Canada, 1969 to 1998.” Canadian Public Policy, 2001, 
27(2), pp. 125-49. 
 
Robb, A.L., L. Magee, and J.B. Burbidge. “Wages in Canada: SCF, SLID, LFS and the Skill Premium,” 
Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population Research Papers No.106, McMaster University, 
2003 
 
Rothbarth,  Erwin.  “Note  on  a  Method  of  Determining  Equivalent  Income  for  Families  of  Different 
Composition,”  in  C.  Madge,  War  Time  Pattern  of  Saving  and  Spending.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1943, 
 
Tamagno,  E.,  “Strengthening  the  Foundations  of  Canada’s  Pension  System:  A  review  of  Old  Age 
Security Program”, Caledon Institute for Public Policy, November 2007. 
 
Thomas,  D.  “The  Social  Welfare  Implications  of  Immigrant  Family  Sponsorship  Default,”  Strategic 
Policy, Planning and Research, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 1996. 
 
Veall,  Michael  (2008):  “Canadian  Seniors  and  the  Low  Income  Measure,”  Canadian  Public  Policy, 
Volume 34, Supplement, pages 47-58. 
 
Xu,  Kuan.  “Converging  at  the  Bottom  of  the  Income  Distribution?  A  Suggested  Methodology,” 
Manuscript, Dalhousie University, 2002.   30 
7.0 Appendix 
 
7.1 The Undertaking 
 
The Terms and Conditions of the “undertaking” (excerpted from Application to Sponsor and 




I undertake to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and his or her family members 
who accompany him or her to Canada, if they are not self-supporting. I promise to provide food, clothing, 
shelter, fuel, utilities, household supplies, personal requirements, and other goods and services, including 
dental care, eye care, and other health needs not provided by public health care. I understand that the 
money, goods or services provided by me must be sufficient for the sponsored people to live in Canada. 
 
I promise that the sponsored person and his or her family members will not need to apply for social 
assistance.  
 
I make these promises so that the sponsored person and his or her family members listed on this 
undertaking can be admitted to Canada as permanent residents. I understand that the sponsored person 
and his or her family members will be admitted solely on the basis of their relationship to me (as sponsor) 
and that they do not need to have the financial means to become established in Canada. 
 
I understand that the validity period of this undertaking begins on the day on which the sponsored person 
enters Canada if that person enters Canada with a temporary resident permit or, if already in Canada, on 
the day on which the sponsored person obtains a temporary resident permit following an application to 
remain in Canada as a permanent resident, and in any other case on the day on which the sponsored 
person becomes a permanent resident. The length of the undertaking will vary according to the 
relationship of the sponsored person and his or her family members to me (as sponsor) and their age and it 
ends: 
  
A.  if the sponsored person is  my  spouse,  common-law partner, or conjugal partner, on the last 
day of the period of 3 years following the day on which they become a permanent resident; 
 
B.  if the sponsored person or family member is a dependent child of the sponsor or of the 
sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner and is less than 22 years of age 
when they become a permanent resident, on the earlier of  
•  the last day of the period of 10 years following the day on which they become a 
permanent resident, or   
•  the day on which they reach 25 years of age,  
 
C.  if the sponsored person or family member is a dependent child of the sponsor or of the 
sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner and is 22 years of age or older 
when they become a permanent resident, on the last day of the period of 3 years following the 
day on which they become a permanent resident; and  
 
D.  if the sponsored person or family member is a person other than a person referred to above, 
on the last day of  the period of 10 years following the day on which they  become a 
permanent resident. 
   31 
I understand that the undertaking remains in effect no matter what may change in my life. For example, if 
I am divorced, change jobs, become unemployed, and/or go back to school, I will still be responsible to 
the sponsored person and his or her family members I am sponsoring or for whom I am co-signing. 
 
I understand that, pursuant to section 135 of the Regulations to the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, if I breach any of my sponsorship obligations I will be in default.  I also  understand that I will be in 
default if a government makes a payment that I have promised to repay in this undertaking.  For example, 
if I fail to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and his or her family members and 
they receive social assistance during the validity period of the undertaking, I will be in default. I 
understand that I will continue to be in 
default until the amount of benefits received are repaid in full or repaid to the satisfaction of the 
government concerned.  
 
I understand that all social assistance paid to the sponsored person or his or her family members becomes 
a debt owed by me to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned.  
As a result, the Minister and the province concerned have a right to take enforcement action against me 
(as sponsor or co-signer) alone, or against both of us.  
 
The Minister and the province concerned may choose not to take enforcement action to recover money 
from me if the default is the result of abuse or in other circumstances.  The decision not to act at a 
particular time does not cancel the debt. The Minister and the province concerned may recover the debt 
when circumstances have changed.  
 
I understand that I will not be allowed to sign or co-sign an additional application to sponsor another 
person under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its Regulations if I am in default of any 
sponsorship undertaking. This holds true for both this undertaking and any past 
undertakings where I have not satisfactorily paid back my debts.   
 
7.2 “Other Income” SCF 
 
Description of “Other Money Income” in Microdata File Documentation, SCF, 1997: 
 
OTHER MONEY INCOME  
 
Description: this variable gives the sum of amounts reported by the individual on account of other money 
income not included in the previous variables. 
 
Included in this amount are:  
 
(a)  Money received for the care of children being cared for on behalf of the Children's Aid Society. 
(b)  Income received from abroad in Canadian dollar equivalent (excluding interest and Dividends.) 
(c)  Non-refundable scholarships and bursaries.  
(d)  Alimony, separation allowance and child support payments. 
(e)  Royalties on books, oil wells, etc.  
(f)  Strike and sick pay from trade unions.  
(g)  Payments from an income maintenance insurance plan or a guaranteed annual wage plan. 
(h)  Severance pay or retiring allowances (not regular pension benefits), etc. 
(i)  Money from persons outside this household to help with household expenses. 
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7.2 “Other Income” SLID 
 
Description of “Other Income” in Guide for Cross-Sectional Public-Use Microdata File, SLID, 2002: 
 
This sub-total includes all items of market income not included elsewhere. Among them are support 
payments received (also called alimony and child support). The coverage of other items depends at least 
to some extent on the method of income data collection, whether from administrative income tax records 
or by interview. Those items which are included on line 130 of the T1 tax return are well covered. These 
include,  but  are  not  restricted  to,  retirement  allowances  (severance  pay/termination  benefits), 
scholarships, lump-sum payments from pensions and deferred profit-sharing plans received when leaving 
a plan, the taxable amount of death benefits  other than those from  CPP or  QPP,  and supplementary 
unemployment benefits not included in wages and salaries.  
 Table 1 
Sample Means: Individual and Family Per Capita Incomes, by source 
Men, 65 years and Older, SCF 
  Native-Born 
Imm 1 
(YSM < 10) 
Imm 2 
(10 <= YSM < 20) 
Imm 3 
(YSM 20+) 
Individual Incomes:         
Total Earnings  $3,162.00   $2,318.30   $1,873.11   $3,738.96  
Investment Income  $4,592.71   $2,870.63   $3,199.01   $5,042.94  
Other Private Income  $385.07   $3,705.36   $959.12   $568.71  
Pension Income  $8,386.69   $3,246.46   $4,736.29   $7,651.09  
Total Private Income  $16,527.69   $12,140.75   $10,767.54   $17,003.51  
C/QPP Benefits  $5,942.75   $1,312.54   $3,470.75   $6,200.90  
Social Assistance  $198.79   $1,575.42   $514.38   $280.64  
EI Benefits  $84.64   $100.26   $133.93   $76.56  
OAS/GIS Benefits  $7,073.67   $857.98   $7,439.61   $6,868.55  
Child Tax Benefits  $7.71   $56.89   $34.58   $6.18  
Other Government Transfers  $278.36   $290.28   $284.18   $284.68  
Total Transfer Income  $8,137.34   $3,672.81   $8,630.84   $7,916.20  
Total Income  $30,607.78   $17,126.12   $22,869.11   $31,120.60  
Proportions non-zero:         
Total Earnings  0.142  0.119  0.121  0.141 
Investment Income  0.580  0.385  0.446  0.604 
Other Private Income  0.055  0.312  0.101  0.091 
Pension Income  0.541  0.246  0.353  0.543 
Total Private Income  0.795  0.644  0.664  0.823 
C/QPP Benefits  0.880  0.226  0.668  0.876 
Social Assistance  0.179  0.269  0.339  0.241 
EI Benefits  *  *  *  * 
OAS/GIS Benefits  0.993  0.141  0.952  0.992 
Child Tax Benefits  *  *  *  * 
Other Government Transfers  0.549  0.583  0.627  0.508 
Total Transfer Income  0.997  0.765  0.981  0.996 
Total Income  1.000  0.894  0.997  1.000 
Family Income Per Capita:         
Total Earnings  $3,655.10   $7,160.54   $7,125.44   $5,109.39  
Investment Income  $3,909.89   $2,042.20   $2,720.49   $4,415.14  
Other Private Income  $300.40   $2,255.28   $813.50   $434.29  
Pension Income  $5,232.30   $1,747.69   $2,385.72   $4,669.27  
Total Private Income  $13,101.69   $13,205.72   $13,048.91   $14,634.64  
C/QPP Benefits  $4,026.87   $643.28   $1,980.51   $4,102.22  
Social Assistance  $213.68   $930.87   $313.38   $243.14  
EI Benefits  $160.80   $215.11   $289.36   $122.99  
OAS/GIS Benefits  $5,884.45   $450.30   $4,787.88   $5,493.15  
Child Tax Benefits  $11.27   $105.75   $55.82   $11.49  
Other Government Transfers  $200.69   $180.88   $201.74   $208.86  
Total Transfer Income  $6,794.75   $2,305.18   $5,774.37   $6,340.92  
Total Income  $23,923.30   $16,154.18   $20,803.79   $25,077.77  
Family Size  2.059  3.760  2.992  2.184 
Family Income Below LIM (AT)  0.035  0.228  0.068  0.024 
Family Income Below LIM (BT)  0.093  0.276  0.128  0.060 
Sample Size  49,722  568  613  8,819 
Notes: 1/ Based on pooled SCF sample, 1986-1997; 2/ All dollar figures reported in constant 2006 values, deflated by the CPI;  3/ 
Imm1, Imm2, and Imm3 are immigrant samples, based on years in Canada (YSM): 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 20+ years; 4/ 
Major sources of income are highlighted in bold, while sub-components are indented (and not bold); 5/ Family size is the number of 
people in the economic family; 6/ Family Income Below LIM: is the proportion of individuals with per capita total income below the 
Low Income Measure (LIM), defined in the text. “AT” refers to “After Tax” income, while “BT” refers to “Before Tax” income; 7/ * 
indicates that the number is too small for release from the RDC (i.e., it is essentially zero). 
 Table 2 
Sample Means: Individual and Family Per Capita Incomes, by source 
Men, 65 years and Older, SLID 
  Native-Born 
Imm 1 
(YSM < 10) 
Imm 2 
(10 <= YSM < 20) 
Imm 3 
(YSM 20+) 
Individual Incomes:         
Total Earnings  $2,522.56   $1,195.50   $2,266.57   $3,412.24  
Investment Income  $3,460.02   $1,353.76   $2,217.78   $3,207.84  
Other Private Income  $504.03   $735.75   $1,151.74   $447.65  
Pension Income  $13,033.60   $4,710.75   $3,588.83   $11,856.15  
Total Private Income  $19,522.12   $7,995.76   $9,224.92   $18,924.03  
C/QPP Benefits  $6,822.07   $1,542.67   $1,352.85   $7,186.70  
Social Assistance  $48.86   $936.61   $283.16   $27.64  
EI Benefits  $85.75   $66.38   $78.72   $70.13  
OAS/GIS Benefits  $6,354.49   $1,971.95   $7,506.78   $6,147.64  
Child Tax Benefits  $1.78   $0.00   $0.00   $1.76  
Other Government Transfers  $645.41   $538.38   $940.22   $946.73  
Total Transfer Income  $7,136.29   $3,513.32   $8,808.88   $7,193.91  
Total Income  $33,480.49   $13,051.75   $19,386.65   $33,304.63  
Proportions non-zero:         
Total Earnings  0.231  0.091  0.093  0.220 
Investment Income  0.576  0.254  0.314  0.601 
Other Private Income  0.188  0.159  0.100  0.200 
Pension Income  0.700  0.194  0.251  0.699 
Total Private Income  0.860  0.526  0.484  0.858 
C/QPP Benefits  0.962  0.276  0.505  0.968 
Social Assistance  0.027  0.106  0.183  0.022 
EI Benefits  *  *  *  * 
OAS/GIS Benefits  0.963  0.270  0.920  0.955 
Child Tax Benefits  *  *  *  * 
Other Government Transfers  0.587  0.728  0.750  0.603 
Total Transfer Income  0.973  0.834  0.961  0.965 
Total Income  0.999  0.925  0.995  1.000 
Family Income Per Capita:         
Total Earnings  $3,632.75   $9,549.27   $8,461.19   $5,597.85  
Investment Income  $3,022.15   $976.60   $2,117.25   $2,838.46  
Other Private Income  $470.73   $481.77   $888.00   $460.63  
Pension Income  $8,675.57   $2,698.79   $1,972.00   $7,822.53  
Total Private Income  $15,812.77   $13,730.61   $13,460.94   $16,730.03  
C/QPP Benefits  $5,015.70   $556.17   $682.35   $5,020.59  
Social Assistance  $138.92   $1,262.03   $420.10   $111.76  
EI Benefits  $121.94   $162.16   $277.21   $101.36  
OAS/GIS Benefits  $5,420.95   $885.35   $4,228.90   $4,866.44  
Child Tax Benefits  $14.53   $177.86   $142.27   $22.65  
Other Government Transfers  $459.85   $429.64   $591.52   $646.73  
Total Transfer Income  $6,156.38   $2,918.03   $5,662.05   $5,749.02  
Total Income  $26,984.84   $17,204.81   $19,805.34   $27,499.65  
Family Size  2.038  4.543  3.692  2.301 
Family Income Below LIM (AT)  0.031  0.201  0.106  0.026 
Family Income Below LIM (BT)  0.080  0.249  0.187  0.054 
Sample Size  36,206  225  495  6,720 
Notes: 1/ Based on pooled SLID sample, 1987-2006; 2/ All dollar figures reported in constant 2006 values, deflated by the CPI;  3/ 
Imm1, Imm2, and Imm3 are immigrant samples, based on years in Canada (YSM): 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 20+ years; 4/ 
Major sources of income are highlighted in bold, while sub-components are indented (and not bold); 5/ Family size is the number of 
people in the economic family; 6/ Family Income Below LIM: is the proportion of individuals with per capita total income below the 
Low Income Measure (LIM), defined in the text. “AT” refers to “After Tax” income, while “BT” refers to “Before Tax” income; 7/ * 
indicates that the number is too small for release from the RDC (i.e., it is essentially zero). 
 Table 3A 
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients 
Individual Income, SCF 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  Earnings  Invest  Other (P)  Pension  Private  CPP/QPP  SA  EI Benefits  OAS/GIS  Child Tax  Other (G)  Transfers  TOTAL 
A6064  -$21,607.00  $1,135.00  $326.90  $5,813.00  -$14,330.00  $2,118.00  $291.40  -$157.70  $168.70  -$205.40  $126.10  $605.80  -$11,606.00 
  (504.2)  (111.9)  (77.02)  (145.9)  (527.9)  (35.60)  (31.14)  (30.99)  (9.943)  (3.986)  (24.50)  (55.66)  (512.6) 
A65P  -$40,526.00  $2,873.00  -$268.20  $6,577.00  -$31,348.00  $5,260.00  -$451.80  -$930.00  $7,067.00  -$234.70  -$48.00  $5,643.00  -$20,446.00 
  (248.6)  (112.1)  (46.37)  (96.82)  (305.6)  (21.61)  (13.05)  (15.74)  (13.44)  (3.167)  (10.66)  (30.97)  (299.8) 
Imm 1 (I1)  -$17,838.00  -$974.00  -$64.47  -$1,473.00  -$20,347.00  -$273.20  $586.40  $227.00  $54.08  $273.20  $68.86  $1,176.00  -$19,444.00 
  (1208)  (199.2)  (267.8)  (125.2)  (1327)  (28.99)  (119.1)  (87.54)  (2.183)  (25.24)  (49.06)  (165.1)  (1294) 
I1 × A6064  $1,652.00  -$353.20  -$208.40  -$4,862.00  -$3,782.00  -$1,533.00  $209.40  -$52.79  -$168.50  -$40.62  $29.26  -$217.00  -$5,532.00 
  (1736)  (452.4)  (341.9)  (408.7)  (1866)  (155.7)  (286.7)  (194.4)  (9.530)  (48.97)  (141.1)  (470.0)  (1822) 
I1 × A65P  $12,008.00  -$1,591.00  $2,973.00  -$4,021.00  $9,364.00  -$4,125.00  $596.40  $167.20  -$6,201.00  -$119.80  -$47.76  -$5,331.00  -$91.17 
  (1271)  (403.3)  (406.7)  (411.8)  (1520)  (132.2)  (209.5)  (99.38)  (105.3)  (30.83)  (53.32)  (272.5)  (1503) 
Imm 1 (I2)  -$4,137.00  -$990.70  -$299.60  -$1,405.00  -$6,837.00  -$162.80  -$67.79  $161.00  $50.59  $205.90  -$21.70  $400.40  -$6,599.00 
  (997.7)  (246.2)  (80.57)  (110.4)  (1112)  (27.77)  (57.25)  (64.02)  (1.893)  (17.84)  (21.91)  (113.1)  (1090) 
I2 × A6064  $8,842.00  $289.20  $271.90  -$4,654.00  $4,747.00  -$1,457.00  -$66.56  -$91.64  -$83.38  -$130.70  $36.19  -$738.40  $2,551.00 
  (2379)  (792.0)  (370.8)  (460.3)  (2674)  (172.8)  (183.7)  (163.6)  (31.35)  (28.04)  (180.1)  (354.5)  (2576) 
I2 × A65P  -$693.50  -$1,085.00  $810.70  -$2,454.00  -$3,419.00  -$1,977.00  $394.10  $206.60  $267.40  -$91.34  $45.87  $506.80  -$4,889.00 
  (1086)  (609.0)  (171.1)  (453.0)  (1405)  (164.3)  (83.30)  (85.85)  (150.4)  (21.86)  (25.80)  (215.2)  (1382) 
Imm 3 (I3)  -$44.76  $23.89  -$151.90  -$1,070.00  -$1,244.00  -$38.54  -$236.40  $74.65  $50.86  $80.85  $30.36  $16.95  -$1,266.00 
  (541.9)  (142.5)  (66.72)  (60.07)  (576.2)  (21.77)  (24.59)  (35.89)  (1.586)  (7.890)  (25.38)  (55.86)  (561.7) 
I3 × A6064  $4,612.00  $260.20  $367.70  -$2,013.00  $3,228.00  -$469.60  -$29.93  $191.60  -$8.39  -$26.07  $75.30  -$14.16  $2,744.00 
  (1376)  (315.9)  (197.8)  (251.2)  (1501)  (80.57)  (62.64)  (77.28)  (25.67)  (9.664)  (61.05)  (129.5)  (1465) 
I3 × A65P  -$3,681.00  -$79.08  $270.90  -$190.20  -$3,678.00  $126.20  $380.10  $222.00  -$158.40  -$39.56  -$6.64  $301.20  -$3,251.00 
  (592.5)  (254.6)  (79.63)  (182.1)  (697.9)  (57.69)  (27.90)  (37.64)  (29.81)  (8.136)  (27.73)  (71.29)  (683.5) 
Notes: 1/  Selected age coefficients from Specification (1). A6064 refers to men aged 60 to 64, while A65P is men aged 65 and older. Other coefficients (age and covariates) are not 
reported; 2/ The omitted age category is age 45-59, while the omitted “immigrant” category is native-born; 3/ Based on pooled SCF sample of men 20 years and older, 1981-1997; 
4/ All nominal values deflated by the 2006 deflator; 5/ Sample size is 534,657;  5/ The dependent variables vary by column, corresponding to each income source (defined in the 
paper, and corresponding to Table 1).  SA refers to “Social Assistance”, “Other (P)” refers to “Other Income from Private Sources”, while “Other (G)” refers to “Other Income 
from Government Sources.”  
 
 Table 3B 
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients 
Per Capita Family Income, SCF 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  Earnings  Invest  Other (P)  Pension  Private  CPP/QPP  SA  EI Benefits  OAS/GIS  Other (G)  Transfers  TOTAL  LIM-A  LIM-B 
A6064  -$8,916.00  $1,239.00  $211.90  $3,164.00  -$4,302.00  $1,305.00  $196.60  -$73.79  $230.20  $61.71  $556.20  -$2,440.00  0.052  0.068 
  (278.6)  (95.88)  (36.74)  (77.71)  (303.7)  (24.09)  (21.28)  (19.53)  (12.41)  (13.11)  (35.99)  (293.6)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
A65P  -$20,391.00  $2,835.00  -$65.57  $4,194.00  -$13,432.00  $3,488.00  -$253.40  -$554.30  $5,675.00  -$14.49  $4,930.00  -$5,014.00  -0.049  -0.012 
  (135.2)  (81.37)  (22.04)  (59.49)  (180.2)  (16.76)  (9.901)  (10.57)  (15.69)  (7.325)  (24.21)  (176.1)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Imm 1 (I1)  -$12,593.00  -$905.90  -$113.20  -$910.20  -$14,524.00  -$274.50  $159.30  -$81.00  -$86.31  -$17.39  $74.45  -$14,724.00  0.143  0.165 
  (496.2)  (88.31)  (77.27)  (56.64)  (523.8)  (14.78)  (58.54)  (37.72)  (6.850)  (20.36)  (74.62)  (509.1)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
I1 × A6064  $3,815.00  -$791.10  -$31.38  -$2,684.00  $300.70  -$993.40  -$73.31  $125.00  -$238.00  $41.05  -$336.50  -$1,029.00  -0.072  -0.039 
  (830.4)  (212.5)  (165.3)  (178.9)  (888.1)  (79.42)  (134.6)  (105.5)  (13.36)  (64.36)  (198.9)  (844.6)  (0.026)  (0.030) 
I1 × A65P  $11,865.00  -$1,611.00  $1,823.00  -$2,719.00  $9,355.00  -$2,895.00  $455.60  $349.30  -$5,243.00  -$3.27  -$4,338.00  $2,122.00  0.058  0.029 
  (622.3)  (275.2)  (208.1)  (315.4)  (775.7)  (74.23)  (117.1)  (52.53)  (61.83)  (22.86)  (145.2)  (776.1)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Imm 1 (I2)  -$4,454.00  -$844.40  -$156.80  -$793.40  -$6,250.00  -$158.80  -$160.50  -$56.18  -$4.37  -$24.35  -$126.20  -$6,535.00  0.004  0.012 
  (499.5)  (117.8)  (38.93)  (48.59)  (552.8)  (15.09)  (26.97)  (29.97)  (12.00)  (16.39)  (63.24)  (541.8)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
I2 × A6064  $7,428.00  -$193.30  $264.50  -$2,393.00  $5,104.00  -$890.60  -$35.30  $53.98  $2.49  $35.57  -$266.00  $3,948.00  -0.048  -0.050 
  (1419)  (388.3)  (262.6)  (340.8)  (1569)  (92.19)  (82.97)  (78.44)  (62.59)  (92.67)  (171.8)  (1518)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
I2 × A65P  $4,170.00  -$953.10  $600.80  -$2,060.00  $1,759.00  -$1,619.00  $276.70  $348.40  -$1,025.00  $26.12  -$591.20  -$451.60  0.043  0.035 
  (667.7)  (496.3)  (116.2)  (225.9)  (873.5)  (102.5)  (45.22)  (58.53)  (140.1)  (20.20)  (163.0)  (839.2)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Imm 3 (I3)  -$1,854.00  -$226.70  -$83.92  -$639.70  -$2,806.00  -$70.28  -$195.40  -$37.69  $40.60  $3.24  -$152.00  -$3,029.00  -0.018  -0.015 
  (256.1)  (69.32)  (30.37)  (32.64)  (278.0)  (13.34)  (14.63)  (18.45)  (9.085)  (13.04)  (31.21)  (270.3)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
I3 × A6064  $3,987.00  $214.70  $128.10  -$983.80  $3,349.00  -$240.00  -$45.34  $173.70  -$20.53  $56.85  $41.70  $3,151.00  -0.017  -0.025 
  (686.2)  (188.8)  (85.34)  (140.9)  (750.1)  (52.30)  (39.28)  (42.19)  (26.67)  (36.32)  (79.02)  (728.6)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
I3 × A65P  $8.76  $313.40  $168.20  -$196.30  $298.30  $57.07  $274.40  $158.90  -$224.90  $8.23  $150.60  $506.00  0.023  0.009 
  (348.7)  (213.7)  (42.14)  (110.4)  (465.2)  (40.58)  (18.22)  (20.74)  (36.07)  (15.24)  (52.33)  (457.6)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Notes:  1/ These coefficients are from the same specifications as described in Table 3A. The key difference is that the income measures are based on family per-capita income, as opposed to 
individual income (as was the case in Table 3A); 2/ The LIM is an indicator variable as to whether the individual lives in a family with income below the Low Income Measure (LIM). LIM-A is 
based on “After Tax” income, while “LIM-B” is based on before-tax income. 
 
 Table 4A 
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients 
Individual Income, SLID 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  Earnings  Invest  Other (P)  Pension  Private  CPP/QPP  SA  EI Benefits  OAS/GIS  Child Tax  Other (G)  Transfers  TOTAL 
A6064  -$29,118.00  $908.30  $622.30  $9,457.00  -$18,128.00  $3,551.00  -$110.60  -$218.00  $95.84  -$27.14  $293.10  $32.58  -$14,544.00 
  (742.9)  (219.0)  (109.4)  (219.7)  (810.7)  (47.44)  (31.04)  (23.52)  (10.85)  (1.997)  (49.02)  (62.03)  (796.9) 
A65P  -$45,147.00  $1,846.00  -$626.70  $10,721.00  -$33,212.00  $6,408.00  -$403.90  -$649.70  $6,379.00  -$30.34  $51.35  $5,346.00  -$21,458.00 
  (436.8)  (142.7)  (61.94)  (129.2)  (493.3)  (22.84)  (14.79)  (14.34)  (17.24)  (1.690)  (22.50)  (34.74)  (486.2) 
Imm 1 (I1)  -$25,007.00  -$1,066.00  -$858.90  -$2,260.00  -$29,189.00  -$363.10  -$14.41  $114.40  $45.82  $57.55  $56.95  $259.60  -$29,292.00 
  (1525)  (158.4)  (102.5)  (148.8)  (1539)  (20.45)  (88.77)  (83.11)  (5.170)  (25.36)  (98.50)  (162.7)  (1521) 
I1 × A6064  $9,245.00  -$680.40  -$671.60  -$5,760.00  $2,122.00  -$3,583.00  $1,361.00  $462.20  -$89.59  -$48.39  -$355.70  $1,331.00  -$130.00 
  (2377)  (576.6)  (178.6)  (1191)  (2610)  (50.42)  (615.1)  (267.5)  (13.92)  (25.42)  (125.2)  (676.3)  (2517) 
I1 × A65P  $17,944.00  -$1,415.00  $938.20  -$5,832.00  $11,632.00  -$4,834.00  $1,065.00  $188.60  -$4,665.00  -$44.79  -$101.70  -$3,557.00  $3,241.00 
  (1553)  (362.2)  (198.1)  (1308)  (2122)  (280.7)  (259.0)  (92.02)  (247.4)  (25.66)  (107.3)  (376.7)  (2159) 
Imm 1 (I2)  -$12,421.00  $85.05  -$548.10  -$2,273.00  -$15,164.00  -$320.70  -$141.20  $167.30  $51.98  $13.47  -$39.46  $51.79  -$15,433.00 
  (1636)  (595.1)  (212.1)  (127.2)  (1739)  (26.99)  (52.61)  (65.76)  (4.694)  (14.19)  (72.34)  (117.5)  (1722) 
I2 × A6064  $10,876.00  -$1,778.00  $810.80  -$9,389.00  $517.40  -$3,052.00  -$67.28  $333.40  $64.43  -$13.04  -$380.40  -$63.57  -$2,598.00 
  (3168)  (817.1)  (1896)  (274.9)  (4279)  (168.6)  (75.33)  (212.3)  (107.1)  (14.07)  (105.5)  (266.8)  (4237) 
I2 × A65P  $5,409.00  -$1,731.00  $973.40  -$7,237.00  -$2,580.00  -$5,084.00  $416.70  $156.70  $1,191.00  -$4.62  $388.30  $2,148.00  -$5,517.00 
  (1667)  (720.5)  (608.9)  (552.3)  (1978)  (148.9)  (66.84)  (75.13)  (199.2)  (13.90)  (98.46)  (257.4)  (1927) 
Imm 3 (I3)  -$421.10  $238.60  -$221.60  -$1,197.00  -$1,603.00  $97.72  -$253.10  $63.08  $42.80  -$3.37  $265.70  $114.90  -$1,390.00 
  (1440)  (520.9)  (117.1)  (112.5)  (1564)  (39.54)  (28.60)  (34.38)  (3.880)  (3.500)  (61.30)  (74.88)  (1551) 
I3 × A6064  $1,092.00  -$429.20  $452.00  -$2,477.00  -$1,365.00  -$742.40  $172.50  $65.01  -$73.11  $9.72  $307.60  $482.00  -$1,625.00 
  (1854)  (585.8)  (312.6)  (510.9)  (1990)  (124.2)  (61.99)  (59.94)  (12.97)  (3.803)  (157.5)  (178.2)  (1955) 
I3 × A65P  -$3,465.00  -$668.60  $105.30  -$415.10  -$4,444.00  $259.80  $246.40  $198.30  -$210.80  $10.29  $84.80  $329.20  -$3,855.00 
  (1468)  (555.6)  (120.7)  (324.0)  (1640)  (62.45)  (28.79)  (37.33)  (39.10)  (3.531)  (74.21)  (95.88)  (1624) 
Notes: 1/  Selected age coefficients from Specification (1). A6064 refers to men aged 60 to 64, while A65P is men aged 65 and older. Other coefficients (age and covariates) are not 
reported; 2/ The omitted age category is age 45-59, while the omitted “immigrant” category is native-born; 3/ Based on pooled SCF sample of men 20 years and older, 1981-1997; 
4/ All nominal values deflated by the 2006 deflator; 5/ Sample size is 292,019;  5/ The dependent variables vary by column, corresponding to each income source (defined in the 
paper, and corresponding to Table 1).  SA refers to “Social Assistance”, “Other (P)” refers to “Other Income from Private Sources”, while “Other (G)” refers to “Other Income 
from Government Sources.”  
 Table 4B 
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients 
Per Capita Family Income, SLID 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  Earnings  Invest  Other (P)  Pension  Private  CPP/QPP  SA  EI Benefits  OAS/GIS  Other (G)  Transfers  TOTAL  LIM-A  LIM-B 
A6064  -$13,421.00  $1,063.00  $514.40  $5,935.00  -$5,917.00  $2,283.00  -$28.91  -$136.40  $119.20  $163.80  $48.78  -$3,585.00  0.035  0.040 
  (394.1)  (138.1)  (70.00)  (142.4)  (441.7)  (34.83)  (27.38)  (15.17)  (13.55)  (28.43)  (43.20)  (430.2)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
A65P  -$24,449.00  $2,031.00  -$263.40  $7,195.00  -$15,499.00  $4,563.00  -$370.60  -$422.00  $5,270.00  $45.99  $4,437.00  -$6,498.00  -0.079  -0.050 
  (224.7)  (87.72)  (42.02)  (84.67)  (265.3)  (19.88)  (13.87)  (9.954)  (18.18)  (14.04)  (28.17)  (259.3)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Imm 1 (I1)  -$18,289.00  -$945.50  -$553.80  -$1,502.00  -$21,307.00  -$414.30  -$51.43  -$86.67  $7.97  -$82.21  $92.47  -$21,629.00  0.155  0.189 
  (632.2)  (68.50)  (68.88)  (55.50)  (643.1)  (14.96)  (57.72)  (30.80)  (30.78)  (33.41)  (83.72)  (619.6)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
I1 × A6064  $9,998.00  -$642.60  -$655.30  -$4,880.00  $3,821.00  -$2,251.00  $664.50  $563.90  -$239.60  -$162.00  $720.60  $2,291.00  -0.125  -0.157 
  (1211)  (372.0)  (100.2)  (343.0)  (1211)  (48.43)  (303.4)  (202.6)  (35.71)  (47.47)  (337.9)  (1140)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
I1 × A65P  $19,715.00  -$1,444.00  $424.10  -$3,954.00  $14,777.00  -$3,964.00  $1,178.00  $291.00  -$4,632.00  $92.21  -$3,173.00  $7,640.00  0.050  0.022 
  (899.5)  (223.4)  (112.8)  (1152)  (1493)  (95.94)  (214.0)  (47.44)  (119.1)  (54.87)  (258.1)  (1459)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
Imm 1 (I2)  -$11,379.00  -$280.50  -$399.40  -$1,469.00  -$13,525.00  -$362.40  -$154.10  $5.06  $99.84  -$66.66  $57.77  -$13,830.00  0.051  0.067 
  (718.9)  (220.7)  (110.8)  (58.21)  (768.2)  (16.20)  (38.15)  (46.52)  (23.92)  (33.95)  (80.16)  (754.2)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
I2 × A6064  $11,376.00  -$1,378.00  $203.10  -$5,676.00  $4,508.00  -$2,032.00  $110.80  $179.80  -$70.52  -$186.90  -$58.66  $2,418.00  0.011  -0.025 
  (1626)  (372.7)  (949.2)  (184.9)  (2183)  (75.44)  (107.7)  (95.49)  (103.8)  (47.50)  (181.6)  (2159)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
I2 × A65P  $11,325.00  -$1,060.00  $625.00  -$5,325.00  $5,589.00  -$3,961.00  $460.10  $334.30  -$1,218.00  $223.40  -$203.30  $1,425.00  0.038  0.064 
  (860.3)  (439.6)  (345.4)  (253.8)  (1044)  (65.52)  (66.07)  (70.88)  (161.2)  (49.72)  (196.4)  (1007)  (0.019)  (0.024) 
Imm 3 (I3)  -$1,849.00  $131.00  -$174.60  -$816.60  -$2,721.00  -$36.19  -$256.10  -$6.97  $59.59  $104.40  -$56.73  -$2,814.00  -0.021  -0.016 
  (650.9)  (171.3)  (62.19)  (59.66)  (715.7)  (25.53)  (26.12)  (21.43)  (12.27)  (31.31)  (48.26)  (704.4)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
I3 × A6064  $2,970.00  -$296.40  $132.10  -$2,151.00  $669.50  -$606.60  $138.90  $80.14  -$15.38  $159.30  $352.20  $415.10  0.001  -0.005 
  (1028)  (263.7)  (201.0)  (285.3)  (1109)  (83.31)  (58.54)  (38.13)  (32.05)  (82.50)  (111.9)  (1079)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
I3 × A65P  $552.90  -$472.40  $89.90  -$307.90  -$129.30  $16.91  $242.60  $142.50  -$572.80  $97.34  -$94.68  -$207.10  0.028  0.008 
  (672.1)  (216.2)  (67.24)  (228.7)  (781.5)  (51.88)  (27.66)  (24.00)  (40.90)  (40.14)  (68.09)  (768.2)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Notes:  1/ These coefficients are from the same specifications as described in Table 4A. The key difference is that the income measures are based on family per-capita income, as opposed to 
individual income (as was the case in Table 4A); 2/ The LIM is an indicator variable as to whether the individual lives in a family with income below the Low Income Measure (LIM). LIM-A is 
based on “After Tax” income, while “LIM-B” is based on before-tax income. 
 
 Table 5 
Estimated Difference Between Immigrants and Same-Aged Native-Born 
Based on Coefficients Reported in Tables 3A and 3B, SCF 
 (* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level) 
  A6064  A65P 
  I1  I2  I3  I1  I2  I3 
Individual Income Measures: 
Total Earnings  -$16,186*  $4,705*  $4,567*  -$5,831*  -$4,830*  -$3,726* 
Investment Income  -$1,327*  -$701  $284  -$2,565*  -$2,075*  -$55 
Other Priv. Income  -$273  -$28  $216  $2,909*  $511*  $119* 
Pension Income  -$6,335*  -$6,059*  -$3,083*  -$5,493*  -$3,859*  -$1,260* 
Total Priv. Income  -$24,129*  -$2,090  $1,983  -$10,983*  -$10,255*  -$4,922* 
C/QPP Benefits  -$1,806*  -$1,620*  -$508*  -$4,398*  -$2,140*  $88 
Social Assistance  $796*  -$134  -$266*  $1,183*  $326*  $144* 
EI Benefits  $174  $69  $266*  $394*  $368*  $297* 
OAS/GIS Benefits  -$114*  -$33  $42  -$6,147*  $318*  -$108* 
Child Tax Benefits  $233*  $75*  $55*  $153*  $115*  $41* 
Oth Gov Transfers  $98  $14  $106  $21  $24  $24* 
Transfer Income  $959*  -$338  $3  -$4,155*  $907*  $318* 
Total Income  -$24,976*  -$4,048  $1,478  -$19,535*  -$11,488*  -$4,517* 
Per Capita Family Measures: 
Total Earnings  -$8,778*  $2,974*  $2,133*  -$728  -$284  -$1,845* 
Investment Income  -$1,697*  -$1,038*  -$12  -$2,517*  -$1,798*  $87 
Other Priv. Income  -$145  $108  $44  $1,710*  $444*  $84* 
Pension Income  -$3,594*  -$3,186*  -$1,623*  -$3,629*  -$2,853*  -$836* 
Total Priv. Income  -$14,223*  -$1,146  $542  -$5,168*  -$4,491*  -$2,508* 
C/QPP Benefits  -$1,268*  -$1,049*  -$310*  -$3,170*  -$1,778*  -$13 
Social Assistance  $86  -$196*  -$241*  $615*  $116*  $79* 
EI Benefits  $44  -$2  $136*  $268*  $292*  $121* 
OAS/GIS Benefits  -$324*  -$2  $20  -$5,329*  -$1,029*  -$184* 
Child Tax Benefits  $139*  $64*  $31*  $141*  $82*  $25* 
Oth Gov Transfers  $24  $11  $60  -$21  $2  $11 
Transfer Income  -$262  -$392*  -$110  -$4,264*  -$717*  -$1 
Total Income  -$15,753*  -$2,588  $122  -$12,601*  -$6,987*  -$2,523* 
Below LIM-A  0.071*  -0.044*  -0.034*  0.200*  0.047*  0.005* 
Below LIM-B  0.125*  -0.038  -0.040*  0.194*  0.047*  -0.007 
Notes: 1/ Each column reports the total estimated difference in income between the immigrants from a particular age group 
(A6064 or A65P) and YSM vintage (I1, I2, or I3), and the same aged native-born. These are based on the estimated 
coefficients reported in Tables 3A and 3B. 2/ Numbers for sub-components of income may not exactly equal the sub-totals due 
to rounding;  
 
 Table 6 
Estimated Difference Between Immigrants and Same-Aged Native-Born 
Based on Coefficients Reported in Tables 4A and 4B, SLID 
 (* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level) 
  A6064  A65P 
  I1  I2  I3  I1  I2  I3 
Individual Income Measures: 
Total Earnings  -$15,762*  -$1,544  $671  -$7,063*  -$7,012*  -$3,886* 
Investment Income  -$1,746*  -$1,693*  -$191  -$2,480*  -$1,646*  -$430* 
Other Priv. Income  -$1,531*  $263  $230  $79  $425  -$116* 
Pension Income  -$8,019*  -$11,662*  -$3,674*  -$8,091*  -$9,510*  -$1,612* 
Total Priv. Income  -$27,067*  -$14,646*  -$2,968*  -$17,557*  -$17,744*  -$6,047* 
C/QPP Benefits  -$3,946*  -$3,373*  -$645*  -$5,197*  -$5,405*  $358* 
Social Assistance  $1,347*  -$208*  -$81  $1,051*  $276*  -$7 
EI Benefits  $577*  $501*  $128*  $303*  $324*  $261* 
OAS/GIS Benefits  -$44*  $116  -$30*  -$4,620*  $1,243*  -$168* 
Child Tax Benefits  $9*  $0  $6*  $13*  $9*  $7* 
Oth Gov Transfers  -$299*  -$420*  $573*  -$45  $349*  $351* 
Transfer Income  $1,591*  -$12  $597*  -$3,297*  $2,200*  $444* 
Total Income  -$29,422*  -$18,031*  -$3,015*  -$26,051*  -$20,950*  -$5,246* 
Per Capita Family Measures: 
Total Earnings  -$8,291*  -$2  $1,121  $1,426*  -$54  -$1,297* 
Investment Income  -$1,588*  -$1,659*  -$165  -$2,389*  -$1,340*  -$341* 
Other Priv. Income  -$1,209*  -$196  -$43  -$130*  $226  -$85* 
Pension Income  -$6,382*  -$7,145*  -$2,967*  -$5,456*  -$6,794*  -$1,125* 
Total Priv. Income  -$17,486*  -$9,017*  -$2,052*  -$6,530*  -$7,936*  -$2,851* 
C/QPP Benefits  -$2,665*  -$2,394*  -$643*  -$4,378*  -$4,323*  -$19 
Social Assistance  $613*  -$43  -$117*  $1,127*  $306*  -$13 
EI Benefits  $477*  $185*  $73*  $204*  $339*  $136* 
OAS/GIS Benefits  -$232*  $29  $44  -$4,624*  -$1,119*  -$513* 
Child Tax Benefits  $195*  $80*  $31*  $200*  $170*  $38* 
Oth Gov Transfers  -$244*  -$254*  $264*  $10  $157*  $202* 
Transfer Income  $813*  -$1  $296*  -$3,081*  -$145  -$151* 
Total Income  -$19,338*  -$11,412*  -$2,399*  -$13,989*  -$12,404*  -$3,021* 
Below LIM-B  0.030  0.062  -0.020  0.205*  0.089*  0.007* 
Below LIM-A  0.032  0.042  -0.022  0.211*  0.131*  -0.008* 
Notes: 1/ Each column reports the total estimated difference in income between the immigrants from a particular age group 
(A6064 or A65P) and YSM vintage (I1, I2, or I3), and the same aged native-born. These are based on the estimated 
coefficients reported in Tables 4A and 4B. 2/ Numbers for sub-components of income may not exactly equal the sub-totals due 
to rounding;  



















































Immigration by class: All ages
 
 
Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration 






Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration 
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Immigration by class: 45 to 64 years old
 
 
Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration 
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Immigration by class: 65 and older
 
 
Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration 
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Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration 
Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents, Research and Evaluation Branch 
 